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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate on private applicants' limited locus standi to challenge
before the European Union ("EU") courts acts adopted by European
Institutions has been ongoing for decades among those who study,
teach, and practice EU law. ' Almost twenty years ago, Financial
1. Over the last fifty years, many scholars have deeply criticized the ECJ's
strict interpretation of the locus standi requirements set forth in the treaties for
private applicants. In this regard, see MASSIMO CONDINANZI & ROBERTO
MASTROIANNI, IL CONTENZIOSO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA 1 10 (2009) (noting that a
different approach more favorable to private applicants is required by the principle
of respect of the rule of law); Anatole Abaquesne de Parfouru, Locus Standi of
Private Applicants Under the Article 230 EC Action for Annulment: Any Lessons
to be Learnt From France?, 14 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 361, 361-402
(2007) (asserting the need of reforming standing rules for non-privileged
applicants in consideration of the inadequacy of alternative mechanisms of judicial
[30:4
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Times published a cartoon strip, also reproduced in a famous
handbook on EU Procedural Law, where two upset gendarmes at the
entrance of the EU court reproached an astonished attorney for a
potential plaintiff asking very brutally: "HOW DID YOU GET IN?" 2
Has the situation changed since then? Are plaintiffs in a better
position today? To answer these questions, a short retrospective is
necessary.
review and of the principle of effective judicial protection); Anthony Arnull,
Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Since Codorniu, 38 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 7, 7-10 (2001) (stating that the requirements which private
applicants must satisfy under article 230 TEC are notably strict); Anthony Arnull,
Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Under Article 173 of the EC
Treaty, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7, 17 (1995) (analyzing the different factors that
brought the Court - at the beginning - to limit as much as possible access of
individuals to the ECJ); Jos& Manuel Cortes Martin, Ubi ius, Ibi Remedium?-
Locus Standi of Private Applicants Under Article 230 (4) EC at a European
Constitutional Crossroads, 11 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 233, 238 (2004)
(asserting that it is time for the ECJ to abandon its restrictive interpretation of the
locus standi conditions); Adam Cygan, Protecting the Interests of Civil Society in
Community Decision-Making- The Limits of Article 230 EC, 52 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 995, 995 (2003) (explaining that the Court's judgments have been
consistently of the view that the granting of locus standi under Article 230 EC
should be narrowly construed); Mariolina Eliantonio & Betill Kas, Private Parties
and the Annulment Procedure: Can the Gap in the European System of Judicial
Protection Be Closed?, 3 J. POL. & L. 121, 121 (2010) (analyzing how the
restrictive interpretation of the notion of 'individual concern' developed in the case
law of the European Court of Justice and discussing possible improvements to the
system of judicial protection); Xavier Lewis, Standing of Private Plaintiffs to
Annul Generally Applicable European Community Measures: If the System is
Broken, Where Should it be Fixed?, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1496, 1498 (2007)
(believing that the Court of Justice and the General Court have introduced different
correctives to the system of review of EU acts provided in the Treaties); Paul
Nihoul, La recevabilit des recours en annulation introduits par un particulier ti
l'encontre d'un acte communautaire de port~e g~nrale, 30 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DE DROIT EUROPEEN 171, 171-94 (1994) (making an overview of the locus standi
case law); John A. Usher, Direct and Individual Concern: An Effective Remedy or
a Conventional Solution? 28 EUR. L. REV. 573, 575-600 (2003) (examining the
advantages and disadvantages of challenging the legality of EC legislation through
national courts); Angela Ward, Locus Standi Under Article 230(4) of the EC
Treaty: Crafting a Coherent Test for a 'Wobbly Polity', 22 Y.B. EUR. L. 45, 45-77
(2003) (criticizing the standing requirements of individual applicants under Article
230 EC).
2. LIONEL N. BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMuNrrEs (5th ed. 2000).
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Before the Lisbon Treaty came into force on December 1, 2009,
under article 230 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community ("TEC"), private applicants could bring an action for
annulment against a decision addressed to them. In the case of a
decision addressed to another person or issued in the form of a
regulation, or an act of general application, applicants could have
access to justice before European courts only if the act in question
affected them "directly" and "individually." Since the early 1960s,
the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") interpreted these requirements
in a very strict manner. In particular, individuals should have been
able to demonstrate not only that the act in question affected them in
their legal situation, leaving no discretion to the authorities
responsible for implementing that act ("direct concern"),3 but also
that it affected them because of certain attributes that were peculiar
to them or circumstances that differentiated them from all other
persons ("individual concern").4
The requirement of individual concern, as interpreted by the ECJ,
made it "exceedingly difficult" to satisfy the test prescribed by the
TEC.5 This opened the door to a long list of orders of inadmissibility
of actions brought by natural or legal persons against acts of general
application. On many occasions, this prevented private parties from
having access to justice regardless of the merits of their claims. This
3. Joined Cases 106 & 107/63, Toepfer v. Comm'n, (E.C.R. July 15, 1963),
available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that a decision which comes
immediately into force is of direct concern to an interested party within the
meaning of the second paragraph of article 173 of TEC).
4. Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Comm'n, (E.C.R. July 15, 1963) available
at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that persons other than those to whom a decision
is addressed may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects
them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of
circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue
of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person
addressed).
5. Brown & Kennedy, supra note 2, at 146.
6. For cases in which the ECJ held that the applicants were not individually
concerned and dismissed the case, see Case T-329/08, AJD Tuna Ltd v. Comm 'n
(E.C.R. Feb. 14, 2012); Case T-108/03 von Pezold v. Comm'n, (E.C.R. Feb. 28,
2005); Case T-376/04, Polyelectrolyte Producers Grp. v. Council, (E.C.R. July 22,
2005); Joined Cases T-236/04 & T-241/04, Eur. Envtl. Bureau v. Comm 'n, (E.C.R.
Nov. 28, 2005); Case T-167/02, ltablissements Toulorge v. Parliament, (E.C.R.
Mar. 21, 2003); Case T-100/94, Michailidis v. Comm'n, (E.C.R. Sept. 15, 1998),
all available at http://curia.europa.eu.
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conclusion raised serious questions about compliance with
fundamental human rights,7 especially when EU acts were of general
application, and-irrespective of their nomen iuris and the procedure
leading to their adoption--did not require any implementing measure
by Member States to produce effects in the individuals' legal
position. For example, that was the case for acts of general
application that prohibit a certain activity. In this particular situation,
a person was required to breach the law to challenge the sanction
imposed at the national level before a national court, and
subsequently ask the latter to raise a question of the act's validity
before the ECJ through the preliminary ruling procedure.8
In his Opinion delivered in the UPA case,9 Advocate General
Jacobs strongly expressed the need for a more flexible approach,
especially in interpreting the individual concern requirement, and the
Court of First Instance (now the General Court) essentially came to
the same conclusions in the Jego-Quer6 judgment.10 Nevertheless,
7. See Filip Ragolle, Access to Justice for Private Applicants in the
Community Legal Order. Recent (R)evolutions, 28 EUR. L. REV. 90, 90-91 (2003)
(stating that proceedings before national courts do not offer effective judicial
protection); Ward, supra note 1, at 45-77 (noting that the question of private
applicants' locus standi risks to represent a violation of article 6(1) of ECHR,
which requires schemes of judicial review "sufficiently coherent and clear").
8. See infra Section IV.
9. See Case C-50/00 P, Uni6n de Pequehos Agricultores v. Council
[hereinafter UPA], (E.C.R. Mar. 21, 2002) 59-72 and 82-87 (opinion of
Advocate Gen. Jacobs) (proposing to consider a person as individually concerned
by a Community measure where, by reason of his particular circumstances, the
measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests)
available at http://curia.europa.eu; Takis Tridimas, The European Court of Justice
and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court of the Union?, in EUROPEAN UNION
LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: RETHINKING THE NEW LEGAL ORDER 113,
120-24 (2004) (stating that Advocate General Jacobs raised the idea of expanding
the reading of individual concern and citing the main criticisms to the locus standi
liberalization); Rosa Greaves, Commentary on Selected Opinions of Advocate
General Jacobs, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 690, 712-14 (2006) (stating that UPA
Opinion demonstrates Advocate General Jacobs' commitment to the development
of a Community legal order in which individual rights are fully protected at
national and Community levels); Constantinos C. Kombos, The Recent Case Law
on Locus Standi of Private Applicants Under Art. 230 (4) EC: A Missed
Opportunity or a Velvet Revolution?, 9 EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS, 1, 3
(2005) (considering the Opinion as a first step in the Velvet Revolution aiming to
overturn the legal status quo flowing from the requirement of individual concern
dating back to Plaumann).
10. See Case T-177/01, J~go-Qu& & Cie SA v. Comm'n, 41-51 (E.C.R.
2015] 747
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the ECJ quashed that judgment,1" confirmed the traditional
May 3, 2002), available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that a natural or legal
person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure of
general application that concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his
legal position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his
rights or by imposing obligations on him); see also Dominique Grisary et al.,
L'arrdt Jdgo-Qu~r - 3 mai 2002: rdvolution, volution ou erreur de parcours?
Vers un largissement du droit de recours en annulation des particuliers, 48
L'OBSERVATEUR DE BRUXELLES 25, 25-35 (2002) (Belg.) (appreciating the
judgment and affirming that a different solution would have impaired the access of
individuals to the Court); Dominik Hanf, Facilitating Private Applicants' Access
to the European Courts? On the Possible Impact of the CFI's Ruling in Jdgo-
Qu~r6, 3 GERMAN L.J. 7-8, 12-17 (2002) (affirming that the CFI's ruling in
Jgo-Qu&6 had the merit of having recognized the problems of the traditional case
law and of having proposed a way how to abandon it); Florence Malvasio, L 'arrdt
Jdgo-Qur6 - 3 mai 2002. rdvolution, 6volution ou erreur de parcours?
L'6volution de la jurisprudence de la Cour et du Tribunal en matidre de
recevabilit des recours intent~s par des particuliers, 48 L'OBSERVATEUR DE
BRUXELLES 36, 36-38 (2002) (Belg.) (appreciating the judgment and recalling that
the CFI has been created in order to grant individuals judicial protection).
11. See Case C-50/00 P, UPA, (E.C.R. July 25, 2002) 41-45 (holding that it
is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures
which ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection) available at
http://curia.europa.eu. For an analysis of the judgment, see Fr6d6rique Berrod &
Flavien Mariatte, Le pourvoi dans l'affaire Uni6n de Pequehos Agricultores
C/Conseil: Le retour de la procession d'Echternach, 3 EUR. 7, 7-11 (2002) (noting
that the judgments delivered after UPA confirmed the traditional case law on locus
standi); Johanna Engstr6m, Turning a Deaf Ear to Effective Judicial Protection?
The ECJ's Judgment in C-50/00 P Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores, 10 TILBURG
FOREIGN L. REv. 375, 384-85 (2003) (stating that the assertion that the Court turns
a deaf ear to the issue of effective judicial protection might be too harsh because it
recognizes that the problem exists, but does not take responsibility to resolve it);
Femke de Lange, Case Note, European Court of Justice, Uni6n de Pequefios
Agricultores v. Council, 12 REv. EUR. COMMISSION & INT'L ENVTL. L. 115, 115-
18 (2003) (considering that UPA clarifies the existing case law by excluding that
the lack of effective access to justice at the national level alone is sufficient to be
granted standing). Many authors considered the judgment as a missed opportunity
to liberalize standing requirements for individuals, See Albertina Albors-Llorens,
The Standing of Private Parties to Challenge Community Measures: Has the
European Court Missed the Boat?, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 72, 92 (2003) (noting that
UPA dashed any hopes that the time was ripe for a re-examination of the case law
on individual concern); Christopher Brown & John Morijn, Case C-263/02 P,
Commission v. Jdgo-Qur & Cie SA, Judgment of the Sixth Chamber, 1 April
2004, nyr., 41 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1639, 1640 (2004) (recognizing that the
J~go-Qur6 judgment does little to assuage widely expressed concerns that the
Courts' case law does not adequately ensure effective judicial protection for
private applicants when wishing to challenge the legality of Community acts);
Cornelia Koch, European Community- Challenge of Community Fisheries
STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE
interpretation as "imposed" by the letter of the Treaty on European
Union ("TEU"), 12 and called on the Member States to amend the text
of article 230 of TEC, if they wished to broaden private applicants'
access to justice.
Member States apparently were not indifferent to that call. The
solution adopted in the Treaty establishing the Constitution for
Europe, signed in 2004, was to modify the conditions of
admissibility of actions for annulment brought by legal or natural
persons. In particular, article 111-365(4) of that treaty allowed
individuals to bring an action for annulment against acts of general
application not only when they were directly and individually
concerned by them (as in the previous text), but also in case of
"regulatory acts" of direct concern to the applicant that did not entail
implementing measures.13 The "Constitutional" treaty did not define
"regulatory acts". Nevertheless, the travaux prdparatoires make
clear that the drafters intended the definition to include any non-
legislative acts, referring to acts not adopted under a legislative
procedure of general application, such as regulations and decisions
lacking specific addressee(s). 14
The Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe never entered
into force. Yet, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU")15, which by virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon replaced the
TEC, retained the same wording in article 263(4) of TFEU, including
Regulation- Admissibility of Individual Applicants Under Article 230(4), 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 814, 814-19 (2004) (asserting that the ECJ missed out on an opportunity
to broaden access to Community courts for private applicants by adopting a
conservative approach).
12. Note that in other circumstances the Court has adopted a more flexible
interpretation of the wording of Article 263 TFEU. See case C-70/88, Parliament
v. Council, (E.C.R. May 22, 1990) available at http://curia.europa.eu (recognizing
that, despite the fact that in the old version of article 263 of TFEU [then article 173
of EEC], the European Parliament was not mentioned among the potential
applicants to bring an action for annulment, it should have had the opportunity to
challenge acts which threatened its prerogatives).
13. Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004, O.J. (C 310) 1, art.
111-365(4).
14. Koen Lenaerts & Ignace Maselis, Le syst~mejuridictionnel de l'Union, in
COMMENTAIRE DE LA CONSTITUTION DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE 231 (2005)
(analysing the travaux pr~paratoires of the Constitutional Treaty).
15. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
7492015]
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the reference to "regulatory acts." The current text reads as follows:
Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the
first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed
to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and
against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not
entail implementing measures. 16
According to the "tempus regit actum" principle, the new rules
apply for all applications lodged after December 1, 2009, irrespective
of the date the contested act was adopted.7 For applications lodged
before that date, the rules on admissibility are those in force at the
time of the application, regardless of the moment when the Court
rules on its admissibility.8
The Lisbon Treaty aimed to remove the main obstacles to an
effective judicial protection of natural and legal persons against
illegal acts of the EU. As the Court put it, this was achieved by
"6relaxing' ' 19 the conditions of admissibility of the action for
annulment. In cases where the regulatory act in question does not
require implementing measures, it sought to avoid a legal or natural
person being obliged to breach the law to have access to a national
court to raise a question of validity of that act before the ECJ.
Unfortunately, the text of the new provision is no paragon of
clarity. Commentators and the Court itself immediately noticed two
problems: first, the notion of "regulatory acts," a term derived from
the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe but not
contemplated in the treaties in force, may reflect a typo in the text;
2
16. Id. art. 263.
17. Case T-18/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v. Parliament, (E.C.R. Sept. 6,
2011), 34 available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that "tempus regit actum"
requires that the admissibility of an application must be resolved based on the rules
in force at the time of submission and further, that the conditions of an action are
judged at the time the application is lodged).
18. AJD Tuna, 28, 2012 E.C.R. (citing the case law which recognises that the
applicable rules are those in force at the time of the application submission).
19. Case C-132/12 P, Stichting Woonpunt v. Comm'n, (E.C.R. Feb. 27, 2014),
43 available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that the Treaty of Lisbon relaxed
the conditions of admissibility requirements by not subjecting the actions against
regulatory acts to the condition of individual concern).
20. See Ricardo Alonso Garcia, Lisbon and the Court of Justice of the
European Union, 1 WP IDEIR, 1, 14 (2010) (stating that the reference to
"regulatory acts" was no more than a simple error, and that the real intention of the
[30:4750
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second, the meaning of the expression "acts which do not entail
implementing measures" was unclear. In a series of judgments
recently adopted, the European courts have chosen what they
consider the correct interpretation of the new rules, defining both the
notion of "regulatory acts" and "acts which do not entail
implementing measures.'"21
This article aims to analyze the practical impact of the new rules
on the admissibility of private actions in the light of the interpretative
guidance set forth by the ECJ. After a brief review of the ECJ case-
law in Section II, Section III uses as a case study the "Bluefin tuna
saga," a series of cases concerning Commission Regulations that
restricted the fishing period of tuna, adopted both before and after the
Lisbon Treaty entered into force. In comparing these cases, the
article seeks to verify whether private applicants now have easier
access to the European courts compared to the situation before the
Lisbon Treaty's revision. Section IV analyzes whether article 263(4),
as interpreted by the ECJ, is compatible with present and future
international obligations of the EU. In this regard, the article refers to
the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters22
("Aarhus Convention") and to the European Convention of Human
Rights23 ("ECHR"), although the accession of the EU to the ECHR is
temporarily blocked by a negative opinion delivered by the ECJ on
the compatibility of the draft accession agreement with the EU basic
texts.24
drafters of Lisbon was not to confer powers on individuals to start proceedings for
judicial review of legislative acts).
21. See infra Section II.
22' See Council Decision 2005/370/EC, On the Conclusion, on Behalf of the
European Community, of the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,
2005 O.J. (L 124) 1, 1 (establishing approval by the EU of the Aarhus Convention,
emphasizing the its goal of improving the public's access to information and
decision-making on environmental issues).
23. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, [hereinafter ECHR].
24. ECJ, Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
(E.C.R. Dec. 18, 2014) available at http://curia.europa.eu.
2015]
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II. BACKGROUND
This section provides guidance on the meaning of "regulatory
acts" and "act which does not entail implementing measures" as
currently interpreted by the ECJ. First, it seeks to define "regulatory
act" which should be interpreted as an act of general application
adopted according to a procedure different from the legislative one.
Second, it focuses on the notion of "implementing measures",
which-according to a recent judgment delivered by the ECJ-
should be interpreted broadly to include any measure that on the
European or national level gives effect or only applies a regulatory
act, irrespective of whether the "implementing" authority maintains
any discretion on the content of that measure. It goes without saying
that the outcome of this recent ECJ judgment considerably limits
private applicants' direct access to the European judicature.
A. THE DEFINITION OF "REGULATORY ACT"
In interpreting the new text of article 263, paragraph 4, the Court
first sought to clarify the meaning of the term "regulatory act" in the
absence of any indication in the basic treaties. On October 2013, in
the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v. Parliament and Council of the
European Union judgment,25 the ECJ upheld the conclusion of the
General Court2 6 that a "regulatory act" is a non-legislative act, which
is an act of general application adopted according to a procedure
different from the legislative one (ordinary or special) as defined in
25. Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v. Parliament and Council of
the European Union (E.C.R. Oct. 3, 2013), available at http://curia.europa.eu.
26. Case T-18/10, Inuit, 2011 56 (holding that a "regulatory act" must be
interpreted to cover all acts of general application apart from legislative acts). See
Sergio Alonso de Llatio, Por fin una definici6n judicial de los "actos
reglamentarios" del articulo 263, 4 TFEU, 44 REVISTA DE DERECHO
COMUNITARIO EUROPEO 345, 348-49 (2013) (Spain) (affirming that the Inuit ruling
clarifies some basic legal concepts in the study of the sources of secondary EU law
and sets the limits of the legal standing of private parties before the EU courts); Jan
H. Jans, On Inuit and Judicial Protection in a Shared Legal Order, 21 EUR.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 188, 188 (2012) (describing the decision as another
example of the "limited options available to NGOs wishing to contest a decision of
the European institutions before courts"); Steve Peers & Marios Costa, Judicial
Review of EU Acts Aafter the Treaty of Lisbon, 8 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 82, 82
(2012) (stating that it would be "preferable that the ECJ overturns the ruling and
provide for direct actions against some EU legislative acts").
[30:4
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article 289 of TFEU.27 This decision was in line with most (but not
all) scholarly commentators28 and followed the Opinion of Advocate
General Kokott.29 The Court reached this interpretation by using the
traditional interpretive tools,3" namely literal, historical, and
teleological analyses.
27. Inuit, 2013 E.C.R. 61 (confirming the solution reached by the General
Court).
28. See R. Mastroianni, La tutela dei diritti nell'ordinamento comunitario:
alcune osservazioni critiche, 13 IL DIRITTO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA, 851, 852-853
(2008) (stating that notwithstanding the ambiguity of the text, the only possible
interpretation is to exclude legislative acts); Christoph Werkmeister et al.,
Regulatory Acts Within Article 263(4) TFEU-A Dissonant Extension of Locus
Standifor Private Applicants, 13 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 311, 311-12
(2011) (stating that a 'regulatory act' must be interpreted narrowly to encompass
only non-legislative acts). Contra Stephan Balthasar, Locus Standi Rules for
Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private Applicants: The New Article 263(4)
TFEU, 35 EUR. L. REv. 542, 546-47 (2010) (asserting that article 263(4) of TFEU
should be interpreted broadly and in such a way that the term "regulatory acts"
includes Regulations even where they are legislative acts within the meaning of
art. 289(3) of TFEU); Michael Dougan, The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning
Minds, Not Hearts, 45 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 617, 677-79 (2008) (considering
that an interpretation of "regulatory act" limited to non-legislative acts of general
application would be a minimalist solution).
29. See Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v. Parliament, (E.C.R. Jan.
17, 2013) 30-61 (opinion of Avocate Gen. Kokott), available at
http://curia.europa.eu (confirming that the notion of "regulatory act" includes only
non-legislative acts of general application).
30. Inuit, 2013 E.C.R. 50 (holding that the interpretation of a provision of
EU law must take into account the wording, its objectives, and its context and
provisions of EU law as a whole). See also Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland,
(E.C.R. Nov. 27, 2012) 135, available at http://curia.europa.eu (stating that the
preparatory work of treaties may provide relevant information for its
interpretation); Case 283/81, CILFITv. Ministry of Health, (E.C.R. Oct. 6, 1982)
20 available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that the origins of a EU law may
provide relevant information to its interpretation); see also Nial Fennelly, Legal
Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 656, 656-
79 (1996) (enunciating the essential elements of the Court's approach to legal
interpretation); Giulio Itzcovich, The Interpretation of Community Law by the
European Court of Justice, 10 GERMAN L.J. 537, 537-60 (2009) (giving an account
of the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice and focusing on the
teleological argument); Miguel Poiares Maduro, Interpreting European Law:
Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2007) (explaining that interpretation is a product of legal reasoning,
institutional constraints, and normative preferences in a specific political
community).
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First, in interpreting the text of the fourth paragraph of article 263
of TFEU, the Court distinguishes between the term "acts" and
"regulatory acts." Provided that "acts" refers to all acts of general
application, the scope of "regulatory acts" should be necessarily
narrower.3' Furthermore, the fact that some language of the treaties
reflects a certain degree of similarity between the term "regulation,"
within the meaning of the second paragraph of article 288 of TFEU,
and the expression "regulatory act," as used in the fourth paragraph
of article 263 of TFEU, does not provide proof that the two terms
have similar meanings.32 In fact, as provided by article 55(1) of TEU
and article 358 of TFEU, the European treaties are equally authentic
in twenty-three different languages; therefore, an interpretation based
on a selection of a few language versions of the TFEU is
unpersuasive.33
In reaching its conclusion, the ECJ also analyzes the preparatory
works of Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe and the
Lisbon Treaty.34 As to the first text, the preparatory works make
31. Inuit, 2013 E.C.R. 58 (holding that not adopting a difference between
"acts" and "regulatory acts," would nullify the purpose of the distinctions made
between them in article 263 of TFEU). For critical remarks, see Denis Waelbroeck
& Thomas Bombois, Des requdrants 'privilgis" et des autres... A propos de
1'arr~t Inuit et de l'exigence de protection juridictionnelle effective des particuliers
en droit europen, 50 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 21, 28 (2014) (Belg.)
(considering it possible to interpret the term "regulatory act" to include all acts of
general application, as opposed to individual acts); Peers & Costa, supra note 26,
at 91 (affirming that the wording of article 263(4) does not necessarily provide that
a "regulatory act" is only a category of acts of general application because
otherwise they would have used a more unambiguous wording).
32. Contra Jiirgen Bast, New Categories of Acts After the Lisbon Reform:
Dynamics of Parliamentarization i EU Law, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 885, 904-
07 (2012) (noting that the term "regulatory act" is most often used as an antonym
of "individual act" rather than of "legislative act").
33. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326)
13 [hereinafter TEU], art. 55(1) (stating that the TEU is equally authentically and
originally written in Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish,
French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese,
Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, and Swedish); see also
TFEU, art. 358 (stating that the provisions of article 55 of TEU are applicable to
the TFEU).
34. Contra Balthasar, supra note 28, at 544-49 (noting that preparatory works
do not bind the ECJ because (i) the Court does not usually consider preparatory
works when interpreting primary EU law and (ii) the preparatory works published
concern only the European Constitution and therefore one can doubt what
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clear that the Praesidium3 5 expressly decided to distinguish between
legislative and regulatory acts, allowing complainants under
regulatory acts to benefit from a more flexible approach to conditions
for the admissibility of the action.36 As to the Lisbon Treaty, the
mandate for the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference, which
constituted the basic agreement for its negotiations, expressly
required to keep the distinction between legislative and non-
legislative acts and its consequences. 
37
The Court also explained that the proposed interpretation was in
line with the aim of the provision, namely to enable private
applicants "to bring, under less stringent conditions, actions for
annulment of acts of general application other than legislative
acts."38 In fact, the new wording of article 263(4) of TFEU intended
to avoid situations in which a private applicant would infringe the
authority such documents have for interpreting the Lisbon Treaty). It is possible to
consider the preparatory works of the Constitutional Treaty given that the Treaty of
Lisbon has kept the same wording and that the European Council had expressly
stated in the mandate for the IGC conference to keep the distinction between
legislative and non-legislative acts.
35. The term "Praesidium" refers to the group of thirteen people led by
Giscard d'Estaing that played a key role during the works for elaborating the
Constitutional Treaty. In particular, the group had to supervise and to draw up draft
agendas for the plenary sessions of the Convention, the body in charge of making
proposals for institutional reforms.
36. Inuit, 2011 E.C.R. 49. See also Praesidium, Cover note to the
Convention on Articles relating to the Court of Justice and the High Court, CONV
734/03, (May 12, 2003) (holding that the wording of article 111-365(4) enabled a
distinction between legislative acts and regulatory acts, maintaining a restrictive
approach in relation to actions by individuals against legislative acts, for which the
"direct and individual concern" condition remains applicable); M. Gil Carlos
Rodriguez Iglesias, Oral Presentation to the Discussion Circle on the Court of
Justice, CONV 572/03 (Feb. 17, 2003) (considering appropriate to continue to
take a restrictive approach to actions by individuals against legislative
measures and to provide for a more open approach with regard to actions
against regulatory measures).
37. Inuit, 45, 2013 E.C.R. (opinion of Avocate Gen. Kokott) (holding that,
according to the mandate for the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference, the
distinction between what is legislative and what is not and its consequences must
be stressed and maintained); see also General Secretariat of Council of European
Union, Mandate for 2007 intergovernmental conference (11218/07) 26 June 2007,
19 (v) (holding that "the distinction between what is legislative and what is not
and its consequences" should be maintained).
38. Inuit 2013 E.C.R. 60 (reading article 263(4) of TFEU in the light of its
purpose).
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law to have access to the Court.39 This interpretation reflects the one
suggested by Advocate General Jacobs in UPA, who called for a
more flexible interpretation of the standing requirements under
article 230 of TEC to fill the gaps in the judicial protection system.n
Finally, as stated by Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion, the
proposed solution also complies with the principle of institutional
separation.41 According to this principle, there is an "indirect
hierarchy of legal norms" depending upon the democratic legitimacy
of the adopted measure, in accordance with the situation in many
Member States. Therefore, it should be possible for individuals to
challenge more easily an act with a lesser degree of democratic
legitimacy, such as a regulatory act, than an act with a greater degree
of democratic legitimacy, such as a legislative act.42
39. Inuit, 2011 E.C.R. 50 (holding that the purpose of article 263 of TFEU is
to allow a person to bring actions against an act of general application which is not
a legislative act, which is of direct concern to them, and does not necessitate
implementing measures, thereby avoiding having to infringe the law to have access
to the court).
40. See UPA 2002 E.C.R. (opinion of Avocate Gen. Jacobs), 50. Note that in
UPA the applicants were refused standing for a direct action and at the same time
did not have the possibility to obtain an indirect review through the national courts.
For an analysis of the judgment, see supra note 11.
41. Inuit, 2013 E.C.R. 38 (opinion of Advocate Gen. Kokott) (holding that
the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts is not just a formalistic
difference, but also a qualitative one). Note that the expression "institutional
separation" has been used by Michael Harker et al., The EU Rules on Standing in
Merger Cases: Should Firms Have to Demonstrate "Harm to Competition"?, 36
EUR. L. REv. 500, 512-13 (2011) (noting that the principle of institutional
separation implies an "indirect hierarchy of legal norms" which depends upon the
democratic legitimacy of the adopted measure). Contra Dougan, supra note 28, at
678; Balthasar, supra note 28, at 547 (both criticizing the parallel with the national
situation because: (i) European institutions do not enjoy the same degree of
democratic legitimacy as their domestic counterparts and (ii) legislative acts could
always be challenged in the context of a preliminary reference under Article 267
TFEU); Bast, supra note 32, at 907 (affirming that there is no valid reason to
assume that a high level of parliamentary involvement indicates that an indirect
challenge, such as preliminary ruling, best suits the purpose of providing effective
judicial protection).
42. Inuit, 2013 E.C.R. 38 (opinion of Advocate Gen. Kokott) (holding that
the high democratic legitimization of parliamentary legislation may result in the
absence of easier direct legal remedies for individuals challenging legislative acts).
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Recent judgments confirm this solution.43 In principle, although
the discriminative criterion is more formalistic than substantive, it
appears quite convincing. The wording of article 263(4) is
ambiguous and could be read in different manners. However, the
solution adopted by the Court appears to be the most persuasive one.
B. THE DEFINITION OF "ACT WHICH DOES NOT ENTAIL
IMPLEMENTING MEASURES"
While the meaning of the term "regulatory act" was immediately
settled, the interpretation of the term "implementing measure"
remained unclear and controversial until April 2015, when the Grand
Chamber of the ECJ delivered its very controversial judgment in
T&L Sugars." The following paragraphs briefly summarize the
judgment and provide some critical remarks on the solution reached
by the ECJ.
1. The T&L Sugars Judgment
The case concerned an appeal lodged by some cane sugar refiners
established in the EU against a judgment of the General Court45 that
considered their action inadmissible on the basis of article 263, para
4 of TFEU. The applicants intended to challenge the measures
adopted by the European Commission and designed to increase the
supply of sugar on the EU market. Two Commission Regulations
("Quota Regulations")46 allowed producers to market a limited
43. Case T-279/11, T&L Sugars Ltd v. Comm'n, 36 (E.C.R. June 6, 2013),
available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that the contested regulations are
regulatory acts, since they are acts of general application that have not been
adopted according to standard legislative procedure or a special legislative
procedure), upheld by Case C-456/13 P, T&L Sugars and Sidul Aq{cares v
Comm 'n, (E.C.R. April 28, 2015) available at http://curia.europa.eu.
44. T&L Sugars, 2015 E.C.R. The Court confirmed its interpretation in case C-
84/14 P, Forgital Italy Spa v. Council and Comm'n, (E.C.R. July 14, 2015),
available at http://curia.europa.eu.
45. T&L Sugars, 2013 E.C.R.
46. Commission Regulation (EU) No 222/2011 of 3 March 2011 provided
exceptional measures as regards to the release of out-of-quota sugar and isoglucose
on the Union market at reduced surplus levy during marketing year 2010/2011,
2011 OJ (L 60), 6. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 293/2011 of
23 March 2011 fixed allocation coefficient, rejected further applications, and
closed the period for submitting applications for available quantities of out-of-
quota sugar to be sold on the Union market at reduced surplus levy 2011 OJ
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quantity of sugar and isoglucose in excess of the domestic production
quota, while two other Commission Regulations ("Tariff
Regulations")47 introduced a tariff quota allowing any economic
operator concerned to import a limited quantity of sugar with import
duties suspended. To take advantage of the EU measures, both sugar
producers in the context of Quota Regulations48 and any other
economic operator concerned in the context of Tariff Regulations,49
had to apply before national authorities, which decided on the
admissibility of applications in the light of the criteria set out in the
respective regulations.
According to the applicants, the General Court judgment had to be
set aside since the contested regulations were regulatory acts that did
not entail implementing measures; in fact, the European Commission
determined every detail, while the Member States authorities acted
(L 79), 8.
47. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 302/2011 of 28 March
2011 opened an exceptional import ariff quota for certain quantities of sugar in the
2010/11 marketing year 2011 OJ (L 81), 8. Commission Implementing Regulation
(EU) No 393/2011 of 19 April 2011 fixed the allocation coefficient for the issuing
of import licenses applied for from 1 to 7 April 2011 for sugar products under
certain tariff quotas and suspending submission f applications for such licences,
2011 OJ (L 104), 39.
48. T&L Sugars, 2013 E.C.R. 39-40 (holding that, according to Regulation
222/2001, "in order to benefit from that exceptional quantity [of sugar and
isoglucose which may be marketed in excess of the production quotas], producers
must apply for certificates to the competent national authorities in the Member
State in which they are approved. Under article 4 of that regulation, those
authorities are to decide on the admissibility of applications in the light of the
criteria set out in the same regulation and then notify the admissible applications to
the Commission"); T&L Sugars, 2013 E.C.R. 41 (holding that Regulation
293/2011 instead defined the allocation coefficient "to be applied by the national
authorities to applications submitted between 14 and 18 March 2011 and notified
to the Commission").
49. T&L Sugars, 2013 E.C.R. 39-40. Regulation 302/2011 provided that the
import duties were suspended between 1 April 2011 and 30 September 2011, for a
quantity of 300,000 tons of sugar. As for the administration of that quota,
Regulation 302/2011 made reference to other Commission Regulations (1301/2006
and 376/2008), according to which national authorities issue the import licenses to
applying operators that satisfy the conditions for admissibility set out by the
Commission, which is then informed of the quantities allocated. Regulation
393/2011 defines the allocation coefficient for applications for import licenses
lodged from I to 7 April 2011, for which the available quantity has been exceeded,
and suspends the submission of further applications until the end of the marketing
year 2010/11.
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merely as 'mail boxes.' Notwithstanding a different suggestion from
its Advocate General,5" the Court dismissed the action.1 First, with
regard to the Quota Regulations, it affirmed that to assess whether a
regulatory act entails implementing measures, the applicant's
position should be taken into consideration.2 In this respect, the ECJ
highlighted that the Quota Regulations only concerned sugar
producers and consequently the action should have been considered
inadmissible because sugar refiners were not "directly concerned"
with the above-mentioned regulations.5 3 Second, with regard to the
Tariff Regulations, the ECJ considered that such Regulations
produced their legal effects vis-A-vis the appellants only through the
intermediary of acts taken by the national authorities, which
constituted "implementing measures" within the meaning of the final
limb of the fourth paragraph of article 263 of TFEU.5 4 In this regard,
the Court clarified that the fact that the Member States did not have
any discretion in the measures' application is a relevant element in
assessing the "direct concern" of the applicants, while it is
completely irrelevant to qualify a national act as an "implementing
measure."
55
The ECJ also dismissed the argument brought by the applicants
that a restrictive interpretation of article 263(4) of TFEU would be
contrary to the right to an effective judicial remedy, as set out by
50. Case C-456/13 P, T&L Sugars Ltd v. Comm'n, 29-40 (E.C.R. Oct. 14,
2014) (Opinion of Advocate Gen. Villal6n) available at http://curia.europa.eu
(holding that the notion of implementing measure should not cover situations
where the national authority merely "applies" an EU regulatory act).
51. The Court also excluded that the applicants were "individually concerned"
by the Tariff regulation. See T&L Sugars, 2015 E.C.R. 7 61-68 (holding that,
although Regulation 393/11 concerned all the applicants for import licenses who
lodged their application with the EU between April 1 and 7, 2011, as the applicants
did, the Regulation was adopted in consideration of an objective situation which
did not take into account the individual situation of T & L Sugars and Sidul
Aqficares).
52. T&L Sugars, 2015 E.C.R. 32. See also Forgital, 2015 E.C.R. 52
(holding that in order to assess whether a regulatory act entails implementing
measures, the applicant's position should be taken into consideration).
53. Id. 38.
54. Id. 40.
55. Id. IM 41-42. See also Forgital, 2015 E.C.R. T 44 (holding that the
circumstance that the challenged regulatory act allows discretion to the authorities
accountable for its implementation is irrelevant in determining whether it entails
implementing measures).
2015] 759
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thus, the ECJ
recognized that a Charter-oriented interpretation could not have the
effect of setting aside the admissibility conditions expressly laid
down in article 263(4) of TFEU.56 In any case, according to the
Court, the treaties already ensure an effective judicial protection for
individuals through a complete system of remedies that involve both
ECJ and courts and tribunals of the Member States.57 In the view of
the Court, individuals who do not fulfill the requirements of
article 263(4) of TFEU can challenge EU acts in the context of
national proceedings through the preliminary ruling mechanism,
which "constitute, like actions for annulment, [a mean] for reviewing
the legality of EU acts."58 Thus, Member States must ensure an
effective judicial protection for individuals in the fields covered by
EU law in compliance with article 19(1) of TEU.59
2. An Interpretation Too Broad to Ensure Individuals an Effective
Judicial Protection
As recognized by Advocate General Cruz Villal6n in his Opinion,
T&L Sugars is the first case-since the Lisbon Treaty entered into
force-where the Court fully addresses the issue of the correct
interpretation of the new conditions for access to the Court to
challenge EU acts.6"
The judgment, confirming the "negative" trend of the previous
decisions toward private individuals' direct access to the European
courts,61 espouses a very broad interpretation of "implementing
56. Id. 43-44. See also Forgital, 2015 E.C.R. 48 (holding that the
interpretation of the admissibility requirements of article 263 of TFEU in the light
of the right to an effective judicial protection could not have the effect of setting
aside the conditions expressly laid down in that article)
57. Id. T 45.
58. Id. 47.
59. Id. 49-50. See also Forgital, 2015 E.C.R. 66 (holding that it is for the
national courts to interpret the procedural rules governing actions brought before
them in such a way as to ensure-as far as possible-judicial protection of
individual's rights under EU law).
60. Id. 17 (Opinion of Advocate Gen. Villal6n).
61. The ECJ has already analyzed the meaning of the term "implementing
measure," although only in negative terms. See Case C-132/12 P, Stichting
Woonpunt, 2014 E.C.R. 50, T-279/11, T&L Sugars, 2013 E.C.R. 37 both
available at http://curia.europa.eu (stating that the challenged acts did not entail
implementing measures).
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measures." This expression now seems to include any measure that
gives effect or only applies a regulatory act at the European or
national level, irrespective of whether the implementing authority
enjoys any discretion on the content of that measure. If this appears
coherent with the ECJ suggestions considered above (that the Lisbon
Treaty revision's aim was only to give access to justice to individuals
that otherwise would not have other alternatives than infringing the
law),62 this interpretation is still unsatisfactory.
In fact, as it is evident in T&L Sugars, the broad interpretation
adopted by the ECJ for the term "implementing measure" in most
cases prevents individuals from challenging EU acts that are
detrimental to their interests.63 The Court affirms that when the
contested EU act entails some kind of implementing measure at the
national or European level, private applicants' judicial protection is
not an issue, as they can challenge that act before a national or
European court, respectively.64 When an EU institution, body, office,
or agency adopts the implementing measure, private applicants can
directly bring an action against it and then, in the course of the
proceedings, plead in support of the illegality of the basic act under
article 277 of TFEU. When a Member State adopts the implementing
measure, the Court's view is that access to justice is guaranteed since
62. See Case C-274/12 P, Telef6nica SA v. Comm'n, 27 (E.C.R. Dec. 19,
2013) available at http://curia.europa.eu (agreeing with Advocate General Jacobs
that the concept of a 'regulatory act' which does not entail 'implementing
measures' should be interpreted in the light of that provision's objective, which, as
is clear from its origin, consists in preventing an individual from being obliged to
infringe the law in order to have access to a court); see also Case C-274/12 P,
Telef6nica SA v. Comm'n, 40 (E.C.R. Mar. 21, 2013) (opinion of Advocate Gen.
Kokott), available at http://curia.europa.eu.
63. This is also clearly demonstrated by Telefdnica SA, 2013 E.C.R., 1, 3,
35. Telef6nica, a company that had benefited from a special tax scheme in Spain,
challenged the Commission decision that considered Spain's special tax scheme as
a state aid incompatible with the single market and ordered the recovery of the aid
from the beneficiaries. The Court, however, denied Telef6nica the locus standi,
affirming that the Commission only decided that the tax scheme was incompatible
with the single market, but it did not define the specific consequences for each
taxpayer. The Court thus concluded that the Commission decision entailed an
implementing measure, namely the recovery order addressed by the State to the aid
beneficiaries. Consequently, the Court dismissed the action as inadmissible.
64. T&L Sugars, 2015 E.C.R. 30; Telef6nica SA, 2013 E.C.R. 28
(explaining that natural or legal persons, who are unable to bring a proceeding
against a regulatory act directly before the EU judicial system, are protected by the
opportunity to challenge the implementing measures that the act entails).
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individuals can plead the invalidity of the basic act before the
national court and cause the court to request a preliminary ruling
from the ECJ under article 267 of TFEU.65
This article further considers private individuals' rights protection
is very limited and does not come close to directly challenging the
contested act's effectiveness. For the time being, it is sufficient to
note that the interpretation of the term "implementing measure" as
any measure of application is unconvincing as the Court suggests. It
leads to the rather paradoxical conclusion that it would be impossible
on many occasions to benefit from the new standing requirements,
which were intended to relax the conditions for access to justice. In
fact, as Advocate General Wathelet pointed out in his Opinion
delivered in the Stichting Woonpunt v. Commission case, simple
formalities, such as a publication, notification, confirmation, or
recall, even if merely optional, might be considered "implementing
measures" and therefore obstruct individuals' direct access to the
European courts.66
Moreover, the approach adopted by the Court prevents actions
against European directives from benefiting from the special
65. T&L Sugars, 2015 E.C.R. 31; Telef6nica SA, 2013 E.C.R. 29 (holding
that when the EU is responsible for implementing such acts, individuals may
challenge and plead the illegality of the implementing acts before the EU and
national courts).
66. Case C-132/12 P, Stichting Woonpunt v. Comm'n, 45 (E.C.R. May 29,
2013) (opinion of Advocate Gen. Wathelet), available at http://curia.europa.eu.
See also Stichting Woonpunt (2014 E.C.R.), 52-53 (dismissing the Advocate
General's opinion with respect to the Commission's decision regarding state aid
compatibility, which would have been implemented solely through national
measures, such as a ministerial decree and a new housing law). Paradoxically,
according to the ECJ judgment, the applicant found an easier method to locus
standi by using the "old" test of individual concern, instead of the "enlarging" test
of the Lisbon Treaty, even though the latter was expressly "less stringent." Another
example of the paradoxical outcomes of a broad interpretation of the term
"implementing measure" is provided by Forgital, 2015 E.C.R., 62. In this case,
the ECJ affirmed that even the custom's authority decision of releasing the goods,
which defacto represents a mere "stamp of approval" of the economic operator's
declaration, constitutes a national implementing measure to be challenged before
the national court. More in detail, according to the ECJ, the customs authority, by
releasing the goods, implicitly approves the declaration through which the
economic operator makes a self-assessment of the duties to be paid. As a
consequence, in the Court's view, the release of the goods constitutes a decision of
a national authority (i.e. the customs authority) that implements EU acts of general
application and directly and individually concerns the economic operator.
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standing conditions under article 263(4), since directives, by their
nature, require the adoption of implementing measures.67 This would
create a situation where the form and procedure for the adoption of
an EU act determines the possibility of challenging it under article
263 of TFEU, in contradiction with the previous dicta of the Court.68
For this reason, some scholars have proposed to exclude from the
term of "implementing measures," acts adopted by national
authorities without any discretion on their part.69 According to this
interpretation, to classify an act as an "implementing measure," it is
necessary to verify whether the authority enjoys a margin of
discretion in implementing the EU act. 70 In T&L Sugars, the General
Court responded to these criticisms, underlining that the lack of
discretion given to the authority in implementing the measure is a
criterion that must be examined in another context. Namely, the
European courts must use it to determine whether the applicant is
directly concerned, while the new requirement of absence of
67. TFEU, supra note 15, art. 288 (stating that directives are legally binding
upon each Member State that they address, but leave the issue of form and
implementing measures up to the national authorities).
68. See Albors-Llorens, Remedies Against the EU Institutions after Lisbon: An
Era of Opportunity?, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 507, 527 (2012) (explaining that a
formalistic approach refers to a situation where the form and mechanism of
adoption of an act determines the possibilities of challenge under article 263 of
TFEU); Camilla Buchanan, Long Awaited Guidance on the Meaning of
"Regulatory Act"for Locus Standi Under the Lisbon Treaty, 2012 EuR. J. RISK
REG. 115, 122 (recalling that, according to the case law of the ECJ, the objective of
the direct and individual concern test, was "to prevent the Community institutions
from being able, merely by choosing the form of a regulation, to preclude an
individual from bringing an action against a decision which concerns him directly
and individually").
69. See Laurence W. Gormley, Access to Justice: Rays of Sunshine on Judicial
Review or Morning Clouds on the Horizon?, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1169, 1187
(2013) (explaining that acts which are merely carrying out the instructions or the
logical individual consequences of a regulatory act do not prevent the regulatory
act from being open to challenge merely on demonstration of direct concern);
Peers & Costa, supra note 26, at 95-99 (noting that any applications for annulment
would remain inadmissible based on the fact that any measures leaving discretion
to Member States would still entail implementing measures).
70. Stichting Woonpunt, (2013 E.C.R.) 68 (opinion of Advocate Gen.
Wathelet) (underlining that the margin of discretion cannot be merely formal);
Case T-16/04, Arcelor SA v. Parliament, 123 (E.C.R. Mar. 2, 2010), available at
http://curia.europa.eu (confirming that a directive that leaves a very wide margin of
discretion to the Member States in implementing and adopting national measures
does not fulfill the requirement of an absence of implementing measures).
2015]
AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.
implementing measures, laid own in the fourth paragraph of article
263 of TFEU, constitutes a different condition.7"
However, as Advocate General Wathelet underlined, it seems
difficult to imagine an individual harmed by a EU act, which needs a
real implementing measure. In fact, according to the Court, to be of
direct concern to an individual, the EU act must "directly affect the
legal situation of those parties ... [since the] implementation...
result[s] from [EU] law alone, without the application of other
intermediate rules.' '72 In his opinion, the condition of "absence of
implementing measures" simply repeats the "direct concern"
requirement.73
In his Opinion on the T&L Sugars case, AG Villalon suggested a
different and more convincing interpretation. He proposed to
interpret the term "implementing measures" as any intervention
implying a certain degree of discretion in the exercising state
authority. In assessing whether the power exercised by the State is
discretionary, attention must be paid to the nature, form, and
intensity of the cooperation required from the national authorities.74
The proposed solution would have also implied a different
interpretation of the direct concern condition, which, according to the
settled case law, has always been considered unsatisfied when
71. Case T-400/11, Altadis, SA v. Comm'n, 47 (E.C.R. Sept. 9, 2013),
available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that the lack of discretion must be
analyzed only in order to determine whether the applicant is directly concerned);
Case T-279/11, T&L Sugars, 2013 E.C.R., 53 (holding that whether the
challenged regulatory act allows discretion to the authorities accountable for its
implementation is irrelevant in determining whether it entails implementing
measures); Case T-381/11, Europdischer Wirtschaftsverband der Eisen- und
Stahlindustrie (Eurofer) ASBL v. Comm'n, 59 (E.C.R. June 4, 2012), available at
http://curia.europa.eu (holding that the lack of discretion must be analyzed only in
order to determine whether the applicant is directly concerned).
72. Stichting Woonpunt, 2013 E.C.R. 52 (opinion of Advocate Gen.
Wathelet).
73. Id. 49. See Peers & Costa, supra note 26, at 96 (stating that the direct
concern condition was not meant to put an additional hurdle besides the "direct
concern" requirement, but only clarify the meaning of "direct concern; similarly,
art. 1(1) of the Special Protocol on the Charter of Fundamental Rights simply
clarifies art. 51 of the Charter itself).
74. T&L Sugars, 2014 E.C.R. 30 (Opinion of Advocate Gen. Villalon)
(noting that the term "measure" means that a certain "power" is exercised, thus
implying that a certain degree of discretion has been conferred to the State
authority).
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implementing intermediate measures required by the act was not
purely automatic.5 The risk is that the condition of the absence of
implementing measures is considered inherent to the condition of
direct concern.7 6 In order to avoid this conclusion, AG Villalon
elaborated a "functional division" between those conditions. As he
explained in his Opinion, the direct concern requirement should refer
both to the definition of the rule and the identification of its
addressees, while the absence of implementing measures ensures that
the rule, whose addressees have been identified, is fully
operational.77 However, ECJ disagreed with its Advocate General
and dismissed the action."7
III. A CASE STUDY: THE (SAD) STORY OF
BLUEFN TUNA FISH
This section highlights the Lisbon Treaty's impact on private
individuals' access to the ECJ. It presents a case study-the "Bluefin
tuna saga"-concerning some Commission Regulations that
restricted the fishing period of tuna, adopted both before and after the
Lisbon Treaty entered into force. The following sections analyze the
admissibility of the action for annulment of the mentioned
Regulations before Lisbon and after Lisbon.
75. Id. 23 (citing the case law relating to the direct concern requirement).
76. Id. 25 (noting that the direct concern, as interpreted by the Court in
relation to the pre-Lisbon version of the Treaty, was already based on the
understanding that where implementation was purely automatic and there was no
obstacle to the recognition of standing to bring proceedings).
77. Id. 32 (defending the "alternative view" according to which the new
wording of Lisbon Treaty should be interpreted in accordance to the "functional
division").
78. The only exception to the Court's restrictive approach to the conditions to
obtain access to the Court is represented by Microban (Case T-262/10, Microban
Int'l Ltd v. Comm'n, 37-39 - E.C.R. Oct. 25, 2011) available at
http://curia.europa.eu (holding that all the ancillary acts, which refer to measures
that are ancillary to the main purpose of the regulatory act, should not be
considered as implementing measures). However, it is very difficult for private
applicants to invoke the existence of an ancillary act because the Court has strictly
interpreted this notion once again. For instance, see Telef6nica SA, 2013 E.C.R.
(rejecting the company's affirmation that the measures subsequent to a decision
declaring an aid scheme incompatible with the common market only concern an
ancillary obligation that does not involve the direct effect of the articles regarding
that decision).
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A. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT BEFORE
LISBON
The first situation concerns a dispute submitted before the two EU
courts before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force.79 On June 12,
2008, the Commission adopted Regulation No. 530/200880
establishing emergency measures to restrict fishing before the
program expiration period. In particular, the Regulation prohibited
Bluefin tuna fishing from June 16, 2008, for the purse seiners flying
the flag of all Mediterranean Member States with the exception of
Spain, whose vessels were allowed to fish until June 23.81 Moreover,
to reinforce the effectiveness of these measures designed to forestall
a serious threat to the conservation of the Bluefin tuna stock, the
Regulation also obliged Community operators not to accept,
according to the same temporal limitations, landings, placing Bluefin
tuna in cages for fattening or farming, and transshipments of Bluefin
tuna caught by purse seiners in the Atlantic Ocean, east of longitude
45 degree west, and the Mediterranean.82
Many operators of different Mediterranean countries challenged
the Regulation before the European courts.8 3 Among them, AJD
79. AJD Tuna Ltd v. Comm'n, 1, 2012 E.C.R., (concerning an action for
annulment brought against Regulation No 530/2008 of 12 June 2008 establishing
emergency measures as regards to purse seiners fishing for bluefin tuna in the
Atlantic Ocean, east of longtitude 45 oW, and in the Mediterranean Sea, and the
action was dismissed as inadmissible); Case C-221/09, AJD Tuna Ltd. v. Direttur
tal-Agrikoltura u s-Sajd, 1-3 (E.C.R. Mar. 17, 2011), available at
http://curia.europa.eu (concerning a decision in which the Director for fisheries
prevented AJD Tuna from buying or importing bluefin tuna for its farming and
fattening ventures).
80. Commission Regulation 530/2008, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (EC) (establishing
emergency measures concerning "purse seiners fishing for Bluefin tuna in the
Atlantic Ocean, east of longitude 45 degrees west, and in the Mediterranean Sea"
in light of the serious threat of overfishing to the conservation of the Bluefin tuna
stock).
81. Id. arts. 1, 3 (indicating that it was prohibited, from June 16, 2008
onwards, to fish for bluefin tuna in the Atlantic Ocean, east of longitude 45 degrees
west, and the Mediterranean by purse seiners in Greece, France, Italy, Cyprus, and
Malta, but allowed by purse seiners flying the flag of, or registered in Spain until
June 23, 2008).
82. Id. art. 3.
83. See case T-305/08 Italian Republic v Commission (E.C.R. Feb. 14, 2012)
available at http://curia.europa.eu (concerning an action for annulment brought
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Tuna, a company established in Malta, whose main activity is the
farming and fattening of Bluefin tunas caught alive in the
Mediterranean Sea with a view to reselling them to traders. The
applicant's name was included in a list of authorized operators i sued
by Member States and notified to the Commission and the
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
("ICCAT").
8 4
Therefore, considering itself part of a "closed list" for the purpose
of admissibility of the claim, AJD Tuna brought an action before the
General Court on August 12, 2008,85 contesting the validity of the
Regulation on different grounds, including insufficient motivation,
violation of general principles such as legitimate expectations and
fundamental rights protected by the EU. Since its activity concerned
the farming of tuna caught by non-Spanish seiners, it also argued that
no objective reasons justified a different date for the application of
the ban according to the nationality of the seiners.86
The defendant immediately raised an objection as to the
admissibility of the action, arguing that the applicant was not
"individually concerned" by the contested Regulation.87 Being aware
of the objective difficulty of having the action being considered
admissible and the time required by this procedure,88 AJD Tuna
against Regulation No 530/2008 of 12 June 2008 establishing emergency measures
as regards purse seiners fishing for bluefin tuna in the Atlantic Ocean, east of
longtitude 450 west, and in the Mediterranean Sea, and determining the action was
dismissed as there was no need to adjudicate on the action).
84. See AJD Tuna Ltd., 2012 E.C.R. 13 (stating that ICCAT authorized AJD
Tuna to the farming and fattening of Bluefin tunas).
85. See id. 17 (affirming that AJD Tuna brought an action for annulment
against Regulation 530/2008).
86. See AJD Tuna Ltd. Application (T-329/08), Oct. 25, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C
272) 38 (holding that the Regulation infringed the principle of legitimate
expectation because the Community legislation on fishing for bluefin tuna gave
rise to a reasonably founded expectation on the part of the applicant that its fish
farming and fattening activities were lawful).
87. See id. 18 (indicating that the Commission asked the Court to consider
the action as inadmissible).
88. See Consolidated Version of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court
art. 114, July 2, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 177) 37 ("[A] party applying to the General
Court for a decision on admissibility.., shall make the application by a separate
document"). The provision requires the defendant to take position on the merits
within the time limit of two months for lodging a defence. In practice, the
interpretation given to this provision is that the defendant may limit itself to
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decided to circumvent the problem by filing a liability action before
a civil court in Malta and requested damages for adopting an
administrative act applying the ban imposed by the Regulation. "
On June 4, 2009, the Maltese Court asked the ECJ to rule on the
interpretation and validity of the Regulation and practically repeated
the same arguments set forth by AJD Tuna in its direct action before
the General Court.90 Less than two years later, on March 17, 2011,
the ECJ declared the Regulation invalid because it violated the
principle of equal treatment irrespective of nationality. In fact, unlike
those flying the flags of other Member States, Spanish vessels
enjoyed a few additional days of fishing and this difference of
treatment was not objectively justified.9" As for the direct action
brought by AJD Tuna, on February 2012, the General Court (Fifth
Chamber) dismissed it as inadmissible for lack of individual
concern. 92
B. AFTER LISBON: How WOULD THIS CASE BE DECIDED TODAY?
The Bluefin tuna saga makes clear the difficulties that private
applicants had to face before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
in order to have their case decided on the merits by the European
courts. The applicants-and this is a very rare situation-were lucky
enough to convince the national judge to submit to the ECJ, through
a reference for a preliminary ruling under article 267 of TFEU,
contest the admissibility of the action, which appears contrary to both the letter of
art. 114 of Rules of Procedure and the principle of equality of arms. The defendant
will eventually reply on the merits only after the end of the incidental procedure
provoked by the objection.
89. See AJD Tuna Ltd., 2011 E.C.R. 30 (stating that AJD Tuna brought
proceedings before the Maltese Court seeking compensation for damage that it
claims to have suffered as a result of Regulation 530/2008).
90. See AJD Tuna Ltd. Application (C-221/09), Aug. 29, 2009, 2009 O.J. (C
205) 23 (referencing arguments similar to AJD Tuna's, such as whether the
regulation should be interpreted to preclude Community operators from accepting
landings, the placing in cages for farming or fattening, or trans-shipments in
Community waters or ports of Bluefin tuna caught in the Atlantic Ocean by
seiners).
91. AJD Tuna Ltd., 2011 E.C.R. 113 (holding that Regulation No 530/2008
is invalid in so far as the differences in treatment among operators of different
nationalities are not objectively justified).
92. See AJD Tuna Ltd., 2012 E.C.R. 47 (dismissing the action as
inadmissible).
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exactly the same grounds of validity previously submitted with a
direct challenge under article 263 of TFEU.
The entry into force of Lisbon Treaty gave private applicants the
opportunity to bring an action under the conditions specified in
article 263(4) of TFEU. In particular, this new chance requires that
an act must be adopted under a non-legislative procedure
("regulatory act"), must be a "direct concern" for the applicant, and
must not require further implementing measures. 93
This raises the question of whether, in practice, the new rules have
made it easier for private applicant to access the Court. A recent
judgment concerning a Commission Regulation adopted in 2010,
which again prohibited fishing activities for purse seiners flying the
flag of Greece or France, provides a good example.94
In its judgment of February 27, 2013, the General Court qualified
the act in question as "regulatory" within the meaning of article
263(4) of TFEU. First, it was adopted by the Commission on the
basis of article 36(2) of Regulation No. 1224/2009 and therefore it is
not a legislative act; second, it is an act of general application
because it is indisputable that the provisions of the contested
regulation were addressed in abstract terms to an indeterminate
number of persons and apply to objectively determined situations.95
As for the other conditions required by the fourth paragraph of
article 263 of TFEU, the General Court first considered the
applicants directly concerned by the contested regulation because
their activity involves fishing for Bluefin tuna using purse seiners.
Second, when Member States stopped fishing after the contested
regulation, Member States were not required to adopt any
implementing measure.
96
93. TFEU, supra note 15, art. 263(4) (providing that any natural or legal
person may, under certain express conditions, contest an act that affects or is of
direct and individual concern to them, or contest a regulatory act that is of direct
concern to them and does not involve implementing measures).
94. T-367/10, Bloufin Touna Ellas Nafiiki Etaireia v. Commission, (E.C.R.
Feb. 27, 2013) 1 available at http://curia.europa.eu (concerning an action for
annulment for a Regulation forbidding Bluefin tuna fishing activities for seiners of
France or Greece, fishing in the Atlantic Ocean, east of longitude 450 west, and in
the Mediterranean Sea).
95. Blufin Tuna, 2013 E.C.R. 19.
96. Id. 20-21
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The Court reasoned that the directly concerned requirement was a
"subjective" element and concerns the impact of the contested act on
the legal situation of the applicant where no subsequent discretionary
act is necessary to produce such an impact. On the other hand, the
Court construed "requiring implementing measures" as an
"objective" element that referred to the act itself, which requires a
subsequent intervention at the national or European level to produce
legal effects. The Court dismissed the action on the merits, but this
case appears to confirm that the entry into force of the new regime, at
least to some extent, enhanced private individuals' access to justice
before the European courts.
IV. FILLING THE GAPS OF PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS' ACCESS TO THE ACTION FOR
ANNULMENT: IS RECOURSE TO PRELIMINARY
RULING A VALID ALTERNATIVE TO AN ACTION
FOR ANNULMENT?
On the assumption that access to the Court for private individuals
is still rather limited notwithstanding the Lisbon Treaty amendment
to article 263 of TFEU, the article explores whether such a gap can
be filled by recourse to other remedies provided by the treaties, in
particular the preliminary ruling procedure on the validity of an EU
act (article 267 of TFEU). After a brief introduction, the article
considers the three main reasons that seem to justify a different
position. First, the preliminary ruling is in principle, as recognized by
the same ECJ, not a judicial remedy for individuals, rather a means
of cooperation between national courts. Second, the preliminary
ruling obligation is not enforceable; even if the Commission
ascertains that the national court failed to comply with the obligation
to make a preliminary reference, the concerned individual will not
receive any benefit. Third, the preliminary reference offers
individuals less procedural guarantees than the action for annulment.
A. INTRODUCTION
At first sight, the Bluefin tuna saga provides a reassuring example.
First, the preliminary ruling procedure allowed private applicants to
access the Court for assessing the validity of the act. Second, in
certain cases, the Lisbon Treaty revision permits direct access to the
[30:4
STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE
Court that the previous regime blocked. At a closer look, however,
one cannot generalize the "positive" solution reached in the tuna case
because, in shaping the order for reference under article 267 of
TFEU, the national court closely followed the same reasoning and
adopted the same arguments as the parties in the direct action set
forth before the General Court.
In reality, good reasons exist for considering the European court's
interpretation of the new text of article 263, paragraph 4 of TFEU as
rendering the Lisbon Treaty revision insufficient for fostering private
parties' access to justice and thereby misinterpreting the spirit of the
Lisbon Treaty reform. The starting point of the whole reconstruction,
or the assumption that the preliminary ruling procedure on the
validity of an EU act provides a comparable legal protection to that
afforded by a direct challenge against that act, is unconvincing. The
next subsections discuss this further.
B. NATIONAL COURTS ARE THE "MASTERS" OF PRELIMINARY
REFERENCES
To justify its strict interpretation of the admissibility conditions
under article 263(4) of TFEU, the Court argues that the treaties have
established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures
designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of EU acts either
directly under articles 263 and 277 of TFEU or indirectly under
article 267 of TFEU.97 In other words, such alternative remedies
97. Inuit 2013 E.C.R. 92, (stating that the TFEU has established a complete
system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the
legality of EU acts); T&L Sugars, 2015 E.C.R. 31 (holding that where
responsibility for implementing an EU act lies with the EU, natural or legal
persons are entitled to bring a direct action before the EU judicature, while when
the implementation is a matter for the Member States, those persons may plead the
invalidity of the basic act at issue before the national courts and tribunals and cause
the latter to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ). The theory of the
"complete system of remedies" has always been deeply criticized because it was
not able to ensure access to justice to individuals. See Amull, supra note 1, at 43
(highlighting the inadequacies of the national courts as a forum for debating the
validity of Community acts); Francis G. Jacobs, Access to Justice as a
Fundamental Right in European LAW, in MtLANGES EN HOMMAGE A FERNAND
SCHOCKWEILER (1999) (asserting that community law protects fundamental
principles derived from the national laws, such as proportionality, equality,
legitimate expectations, legal certainty, and fundamental rights; however, the
position of standing is more restrictive than many national legal systems); Jean-
20151
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counterbalance private individuals' limited access to direct actions,
thus guaranteeing effective protection against illegal acts. In the
Court's opinion, article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
which codifies the right to an effective remedy as a basic human
right, would also support this, since it would require individuals to be
able to challenge EU acts but does not unconditionally entitle
individuals to bring an action for annulment directly before the
ECJ.98
However, even in the context of "enlarged" system of judicial
protection involving both European and national courts following the
new text of article 19(1) of TEU,99 the ECJ's reasoning is not
convincing.
The main reason is that preliminary ruling procedure on validity is
not accessible to the parties of a dispute before national courts. Such
procedure is, in principle, not a judicial remedy for individuals,
rather a means of cooperation between national courts and the ECJ
when an action is brought before national courts.100 In fact, as the
Claude Bonichot, Le recours des particuliers dans le droit de l'Union: parcours du
combattant ou syst~me complet de voies de recours?, 100 L'OBSERVATEUR DE
BRUXELLES 28, 30-31 (2015) (noting that attributing to preliminary ruling, rather
than to the action for annulment, the role of judicial remedy at the disposal of
individuals is coherent with the "decentralized" system of protection established by
the treaties). The Authors, however, respectfully disagree with such approach for
two main reasons (that will be better explained in this section): (a) the primary
function of the preliminary ruling procedure is to ensure cooperation between ECJ
and national courts and not individuals judicial protection; (b) the ECJ-according
to the Fotofrost case law-is the only court empowered to review the validity of EU
acts and therefore it is difficult to understand why it is necessary to oblige
interested parties to follow a complicated route via a national court before reaching
the ECJ.
98. Inuit, 2013 E.C.R. 105 (rejecting appellants' argument that article 47 of
the Charter is incompatible with the concept of "regulatory act" found in the fourth
paragraph of article 263 of TFEU); T&L Sugars, 2015 E.C.R. 43 (holding that
article 47 of the Charter is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid
down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to the admissibility of
direct actions brought before the Courts of the EU).
99. TEU, supra note 33, art. 19(1) ("The Court of Justice of the European
Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialized courts.
It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is
observed. Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal
protection in the fields covered by Union law").
100. Joined Cases C-354 & 355/04 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistia v. Council,
(E.C.R. Oct. 26, 2006) 95 (opinion of Advocate Gen. Mengozzi) available at
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Court frequently states, only the national court is responsible for
deciding if a reference is necessary to resolve a specific case, and the
content of the questions to refer, while the parties may only suggest
the questions that they consider appropriate. "
It is true that a question of validity requires a decision from the
ECJ even if it is raised before a "lower" court, since national courts
are not empowered to declare an EU act invalid. 102 Nevertheless, the
Court has consistently held that any national court, including those of
last resort, cannot be deprived of its competence to decide: (a) the
relevance of a preliminary question, including that of validity, for the
solution of the dispute'03 and (b) the very object of the questions to
refer, which in principle may be different from what the parties
suggested or similar to what one party requested but opposite to what
the other party requested. 04
http://curia.europa.eu (noting that a reference for a preliminary ruling, including
one regarding validity, is not a remedy in the true sense but a means of cooperation
between national courts and the Community court in the context of an action that
can be brought before national courts).
101. Case C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi v. Autorit't garante della
concorrenza e del mercato, 28-29, 32 (E.C.R. July 18, 2013), available at
http://curia.europa.eu (stressing that regardless of suggestions from parties, the
Court alone ultimately decides on the question).
102. See Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Laibeck-Ost, (E.C.R. Oct. 22,
1987) available at http://curia.europa.eu (finding that the national Court cannot
declare decisions of the European Commission invalid, as only the ECJ is
competent to do so).
103. See Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi v Belgian State (E.C.R.
Oct. 18, 1990) 34 available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that it is for the
national courts to determine both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to
enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they
submit to the Court). National Court of last resort can decide not to refer a question
for preliminary ruling in two different situations: in case of an "acte eclairP' and
of an "acte clair". See Joined Cases 28, 29, & 30/62, Da Costa en Shaake N. V v.
Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, (E.C.R. Mar. 27, 1963) 38 (noting that
according to the theory of the acte eclair6, national courts can decide not to refer
questions for preliminary ruling in some circumstances, such as when the question
has already been raised in a previous ruling), and Case 283-81, CILFITv. Ministry
of Health, (E.C.R. Oct. 6, 1982) 13-14 (explaining the theory of the acte clair,
which states that courts may not refer questions of validity and decide the matter
themselves if the answer is obvious and there can be no reasonable doubt).
104. Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, 2013 E.C.R. 29 (affirming that the
parties to the main proceedings cannot change the tenor of the questions prepared
by the national court).
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In light of this, it does not seem possible to concur with the
Court's finding in Inuit (as in other subsequent rulings) that "requests
for preliminary rulings which seek to ascertain the validity of a
measure constitute, like actions for annulment, means for reviewing
the legality of [EU] acts." The Court employed such a finding to
justify a strict interpretation of the new treaty provisions on standing
of private applicants.'05 The preliminary ruling procedure enables a
review of the validity of EU acts; yet, its "masters" are national
courts, rather than private applicants. On the contrary, direct
challenge allows applicants to fully decide the grounds for
annulment (which obviously can or cannot be shared by the
European courts, but this concerns the merits of the case, not its
admissibility), not to mention the huge difference in terms of time
and costs between a direct action before the General Court (to be
brought within the two months period provided by the treaty) and a
long and complicated proceedings that by its nature involves national
courts (often until the last resort) and the ECJ.
C. THE FAILURE OF THE OBLIGATION TO REFER IS NOT
ENFORCEABLE
There is another factor capable of further amplifying the great
disparity between direct and indirect access to the European courts
and that depends on the structural differences existing between the
two remedies. In fact, if the General Court dismisses an action as
inadmissible or unfounded, individuals concerned can challenge that
decision before the ECJ; if a national court of last instance, instead,
breaches its obligation to refer to the ECJ under article 267,
paragraph 3 of TFEU, very limited remedies are available to
unsatisfied private parties. 1
06
First, failing to comply with the obligation to make a preliminary
reference can lead the Commission to open an infringement
105. Inuit, 2013 E.C.R., 95 (owing this to the fact that parties have the right to
challenge the legality of an EU act of general application by challenging its
implementing measures).
106. But see Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union art. 43, Feb. 14,
1984, 1984 O.J. (C 77) 33 (proposing a right of appeal to the ECJ against the
decisions of national courts of last instance where reference to the Court for a
preliminary ruling was refused or where a preliminary ruling of the Court was
disregarded).
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procedure against the Member State in question under article 258 of
TFEU. 1°7 However, according to the Court's case law,1"8 the
Commission enjoys full discretion in deciding whether or not to
commence infringement proceedings and to refer a case to the Court.
Moreover, such a remedy risks being ineffective for the interested
person because, when the Commission potentially opens an
infringement procedure or a ECJ judgment under article 258 of
TFEU, it has no consequences on the national judicial decision taken
in breach of the obligation to refer, which will become res iudicata
when all national judicial remedies have been exhausted. In fact,
once a national judicial decision reaches the final stage, it can be no
longer called into question, even if doing so would enable the
Member State to remedy an infringement of EU law.109 This
principle, affirmed by the ECJ, can be set-aside only in very specific
situations,10 which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
107. Case C-129/00, Comm'n v. Italy, (E.C.R. Dec. 9, 2003) 29 available at
http://curia.europa.eu ("[A] Member State's failure to fulfill obligations may, in
principle, be established.., whatever the agency of that State whose action or
inaction is the cause of the failure to fulfill its obligations, even in the case of a
constitutionally independent institution").
108. Case 247/87, Star Fruit Co. SA v. Comm'n, (E.C.R. Feb. 14, 1989) 11
available at http://curia.europa.eu (claiming that because of this discretion,
individuals cannot requires the Commission to adopt any specific position); see
also Roberto Mastroianni, The Enforcement Procedure Under Article 169 of the
EC Treaty and the Powers of the European Commission: Quis Custodiet
Custodes?, 1 EUR. PUB. L. 535, 536-37 (1995) (contesting the Commission's wide
discretion and requiring at least a statement of reasons in case the Commission
does not follow the complainant's request).
109. See Case C-234/04, Kapferer v. Schlank & Schick GmbH, (E.C.R. Mar. 16,
2006) 21 available at http://curia.europa.eu (noting that Community law does not
"require" national courts to remove finality of a decision in these circumstances).
110. See Alexander Kornezov, Res Judicata of National Judgments
Incompatible with EU Law: Time for a Major Rethink?, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
809, 819-24 (2014) (indicating that "there have so far been three judgments in
which the Court has had to deal with the question of the objective limits of
authority of res judicata of national judgments incompatible with EU law"); Case
C-224/01, Kibler v. Austria, (E.C.R. Sept. 30, 2003) 39 (holding that the
applicant in an action to establish the liability of the State will, if successful, secure
an order against it for reparation of the damage incurred but not necessarily a
declaration invalidating the status of res judicata of the judicial decision which
was responsible for the damage); Case C-119/05, Ministero dell'Industria, del
Commercio e dell'Artigianato v. Lucchini SpA, (E.C.R. July 18, 2007) 63
(finding that Community law precludes the application of a provision of national
law which seeks to lay down the principle of res judicata in so far as the
application of that provision prevents the recovery of state aid granted in breach of
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Second, another potential form of redress in case of a breach of the
duty to refer is filing a domestic action for damages against the
Member State concerned. In Francovich v. Italy,'11 Brasserie du
Pcheur SA v. Germany,112 and in a numerous other judgments, 13 the
Court held that parties must fulfill three conditions to establish state
liability: (1) the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer
rights on individuals; (2) the breach must be sufficiently serious; and
Community law which has been found to be incompatible with the common
market in a decision of the Commission which has become final); Case C-2/08,
Amministrazione dell'Economia e delle Finanze and Agenzia delle Entrate v.
Fallimento Olimpiclub Srl, (E.C.R. Sept. 3, 2009) 29 available at
http://curia.europa.eu (reasoning in the interest of legal certainty and principle of
effectiveness that "not only does the interpretation in question prevent a judicial
decision that has acquired the force of res judicata from being called into
question .... it also prevents any finding on a fundamental issue common to other
cases ... from being called into question"); see also Case C-213/13, Impresa
Pizzarotti & C. SpA v. Comune di Bari, 64 (E.C.R. July 10, 2014), available at
http://curia.europa.eu (holding that to the extent that it is authorized to do so by the
applicable domestic rules of procedure, a national court which has given a ruling at
last instance, without a reference having first been made to the Court of Justice
under Article 267 of TFEU, that has led to a situation which is incompatible with
the EU legislation must either supplement or go back on that definitive ruling so as
to take into account any interpretation of that legislation provided by the Court
subsequently).
111. Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italy, (E.C.R.Nov. 19, 1991)
available at http://curia.europa.eu (recognizing the principle of state liability as a
direct consequence of the duty of sincere cooperation, as set out in article 4(3) of
TEU).
112. Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pcheur SA v. Germany,
(E.C.R. Mar. 5, 1996) available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that the principle
of state liability applies to any breach of EU law, "whatever be the organ of the
State whose act or omission was responsible for the breach").
113. See Case C- 118/08, Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales SAL v.
Administraci6n del Estado, 29-48 (E.C.R. Jan. 26, 2010), available at
http://curia.europa.eu (making clear, along with the cases cited therein, that if these
conditions are satisfied, the Member State must make the reparation on the basis of
national law, provided that these rules are not less favorable than those relating to
similar domestic claims, as well as not framed as to make gaining reparation
"impossible or excessively difficult"); Case C-445/06, Danske Slagterier v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 37-39 (E.C.R. Mar. 24, 2009) available at
http://curia.europa.eu (concerning the compatibility of a limitation period for the
action for reparation of loss or damage with the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness); Case C-470/03, A.G.M.-COS.MET Srl v. Suomen valtio, (E.C.R.
Apr. 17, 2007) 75-99 available at http://curia.europa.eu (mentioning that EU
law does not preclude individual civil servants being personally liable in addition
to the State).
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(3) there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the
obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the
injured parties. However, according to the Court,114 the breach of the
obligation to refer is not a sufficiently serious violation per se, which
makes obtaining reparation very difficult.
Remarkably enough, individuals have a greater opportunity to
obtain reparation by bringing an action against he State before the
European Court of Human Rights ("Eur.Ct.H.R."), which is a
completely different context from EU legal order. In fact, recent
Eur.Ct.H.R. judgments"5 confirm that a national jurisdictional
procedure is not "fair" and therefore violates article 6(1) of ECHR if
the national court of last resort does not respect the obligation to
refer notwithstanding the applicant's request. In any event, the
actions against he State brought by private applicants before the
Eur.Ct.H.R. aimed to obtain, in casu, just satisfaction. However, in
many cases this was insufficient to undo the injustice to the
individual caused by the contested EU measure. 11
6
114. See K6bler, 2003 E.C.R. (finding that the decision of the
Verwaltungsgerichtshof dismissing Mr K6bler's action did not constitute a
manifest infringement of Community law and thus does not render the Austrian
State liable); see also FABIO FERRARO, LA RESPONSABILITA RISARCITORIA DEGLI
STATI PER VIOLAZIONE DEL DIRITTO DELL'UNIONE (2012).
115. See Dhahbi v. Italy, App. No. 17120/09, 33-34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 8,
2014), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
142504 (holding that Italy violated article 6 of the Convention because the national
court of last instance did not explain why it decided not to make the preliminary
reference to the ECJ); Ullens de Schooten & Rezabek V. Belgium, App. Nos.
3989/03 & 38353/07, 59-60 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 20, 2011), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108382 (affirming that
article 6(1) "imposes... in this context, an obligation on domestic courts to give
reasons, in the light of the applicable law, for any decisions in which they refuse to
refer a preliminary question, especially where the applicable law allows for such a
refusal only on an exceptional basis"). See generally Luc Donnay, L'obligation
incombant au juge de poser une question pr~judicielle t la Cour de justice,
lment vaporeux du procds 6quitable, 96 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 887, 902 (2013) (noting that the Strasbourg Court is frequently called
upon to intercede and provide commentary on the application of the EU law but
attempts to do so in a delicate manner).
116. See Kornezov, supra note 110, at 810 (providing the example of persons
still subject to discrimination or who cannot effectively exercise their right to free
movement and damages cannot undo these injustices).
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D. THE LIMITED PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES OFFERED IN A
PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEEDING
In addition, the preliminary ruling procedure offers fewer
procedural guarantees than a direct action. This is particularly true
for the author of the contested European act.
First, the Institution adopting the contested measure is not a party
to the procedure from the beginning to the end. The preliminary
ruling procedure allows EU institutions to intervene before the
ECJ.117 However, the same institution also cannot file an intervention
before the national court. The latter would then take its decision
without having the opportunity to hear the views of the act's author.
On the contrary, in a direct action, the institution that adopted the
contested measure is a party to the procedure from the beginning to
the end. I18
Second, rules governing preliminary ruling procedure can
determine a breach of the audi alteram partem principle. According
to the Court's procedural rules, in a preliminary ruling proceeding,
the parties have to send their written pleadings simultaneously,
without having the opportunity to read the counterparty's pleading
and to answer to the observations provided therein, if not at the
hearing (if one takes place)." 9 On the contrary, a direct action allows
117. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice art. 96, 2012 O.J. (L 265) 1, 29
(allowing the Institution that adopted the act to submit observations to the ECJ).
See also UPA, 2002 E.C.R., 46 (opinion of Advocate Gen. Jacobs) (preferring
proceedings before the General Court under article 230 of EC over reference
proceedings under article 234 of EC, in part because in the latter only Institutions
can submit observations, not individual third parties); Waelbroeck & Bombois,
supra note 31, at 20 (noting that the preliminary ruling offers less procedural
guarantees than a direct action).
118. See Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Union art. 40, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 210 (stating that, according to article 40(1) of the
Statute of the Court, institutions and Member States may intervene before the
ECJ).
119. See id. art. 23(2) (affirming that the parties, the Member States, the
Commission and, where appropriate, the institution, body, office or agency which
adopted the act the validity or interpretation of which is in dispute, shall be entitled
to submit statements of case or written observations to the Court within two
months of this notification); see also UPA, 2002 E.C.R. 46 (opinion of Advocate
Gen. Jacobs) (finding direct action's preferable because they are unlike reference
proceedings, which involve only a "single round of observations followed by oral
observations before the Court"); see also Waelbroeck & Bombois, supra note 31,
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for a full exchange of pleadings; in fact, the application and the
defense are normally followed by a reply and a rejoinder. 0
Third, the preliminary ruling procedure makes it difficult for other
individuals to intervene before the ECJ. In a preliminary ruling
proceeding, interested individuals cannot submit their observations to
the ECJ, unless they have already taken part in the proceedings
before the national court. 121 In contrast, a direct action allows parties
that are able to establish a sufficient interest to intervene before the
ECJ. 1
22
Fourth, the interim measures adopted by a national court have a
limited effectiveness. If a national court considers it appropriate to
adopt interim measures, the effects of those measures only concern
the relevant Member State. Therefore, applicants may need to bring
proceedings in more than one Member State to obtain interim
protection of their legitimate interests. On the contrary, interim
measures adopted by ECJ in the course of a direct action are
immediately applicable in all EU countries.1
23
Fifth, some national jurisdictions may not refer questions to the
ECJ.124 According to the ECJ, national courts must comply with a
few requirements in order to be considered as a "court" authorized to
at 21 (noting that the preliminary ruling offers less procedural guarantees than a
direct action).
120. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, supra note 117, art. 126 (stating
that the application initiating proceedings and the defense may be supplemented by
a reply from the applicant and by a rejoinder from the defendant).
121. See id. art. 96 (excluding interested individuals that are not parties to the
main proceedings from a list of parties authorized to submit observations in
preliminary ruling proceedings); see also UPA, 2002 E.C.R. 47 (opinion of
Advocate Gen. Jacobs) (stressing that meeting the prerequisite of taking part in the
proceedings before the national court can be difficult because most individuals are
likely not aware of actions in the national courts at sufficiently early stages).
122. See Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, supra note 117, art. 130
(providing that the application to intervene should also explain the circumstances
establishing the right to intervene).
123. See TFEU, supra note 15, arts. 278-79 (holding that actions brought before
the Court of Justice "shall not have suspensory effect" and prescribing the Court
with the power to prescribe necessary interim measures in any case); see also UPA,
2002 E.C.R. 44 (opinion of Advocate Gen. Jacobs) (explaining that bringing
proceedings in different Member States opens the possibility of conflicted
decisions in each State, subverting uniform application of Community law).
124. See Waelbroeck & Bombois, supra note 31, at 20 (noting that the
preliminary ruling offers less procedural guarantees than  direct action).
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refer. Therefore, not all national courts meet these requirements. For
example, this is the case for arbitration tribunals. 125
To conclude, the different rationale underlying the preliminary
ruling and the action for annulment also influences the structure of
the two remedies. Consequently, the preliminary ruling, which is in
principle a means of cooperation between courts, does not offer the
same procedural guarantees of a direct action. The structural and
procedural differences between the two remedies cast serious doubts
on the ECJ's finding that the two procedures are equivalent in terms
of effectiveness of judicial protection. In addition, it is doubtful that
the Court's interpretation of article 263(4) is compatible with present
and future international obligations of the EU.
V. INTERPRETING THE ADMISSIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 263 TFEU IN THE
LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The EU is a contracting party to a number of international
agreements, granting rights or imposing obligations vis-t-vis third-
states or other international organizations. Often these agreements
aim to improve private individuals' rights in their relations with
public power, including European institutions. This article argues
that a more generous approach by the Court towards "non-
privileged" applicants, in particular a stricter interpretation of
"implementing measures," would be more in line not only with the
"internal" requirements of the rule of law but also with international
obligations of the EU. The next subsections analyze the compatibility
of the restrictive interpretation on the admissibility requirements
adopted by the ECJ with the present obligations under article 6.1 of
the Aarhus Convention and with the future (but, at the moment, very
uncertain) obligations arising from accession to the ECHR.
125. See Case 102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei
Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co., (E.C.R. Mar. 23, 1982) available at
http://curia.europa.eu 13 (finding that arbitration procedure is not sufficient
enough to the organization of legal remedies of the Member State's courts to be a
national court under article 177 of the Treaty).
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A. THE ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: THE CASE OF THE AARHUS
CONVENTION
The Aarhus Convention126 is a multilateral agreement about
government accountability, transparency, and responsiveness on
environmental matters. 127 It was adopted at the Fourth "Environment
for Europe" Ministerial Conference in Aarhus, Denmark on June 25,
1998 and entered into force on October 30, 2001. Currently, it counts
forty-seven parties, which include all EU Member States, with the
exception of Ireland, and the EU since May 2005.128
The prescriptive part of the Aarhus Convention is structured
around three pillars, namely: (1) access to environmental information
to allow the public to know and understand what is happening in the
environment around them;129 (2) public participation in decision-
making to improve the ability of authorities to carry out their
responsibilities and to provide the necessary conditions for the public
to enjoy their rights and meet their own obligations; 3 0 and (3) access
to justice to provide procedures and remedies to members of the
public to enjoy the rights enshrined in the Aarhus Convention.31
126. See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters ("Aarhus Convention"), June 25, 1998, available at
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf. See
generally Elisa Morgera, An Update on the Aarhus Convention and its Continued
Global Relevance, 14 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 138, 138-47
(2005) (detailing the groundbreaking features of some of the initiatives enacted
within the Convention's framework); Vera Rodenhoff, The Aarhus Convention and
its Implications for the "Institutions" of the European Community, 11 REV. EUR.
COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL L. 343, 343-57 (2002) (laying out the Convention's
pillars of public participation and access to justice and the difficulties of their
implementation); Jeremy Wates, The Aarhus Convention: A Driving Force for
Environmental Democracy, 1 J. FOR EUR. ENVTL. & PLAN. L. 2, 2-11 (2005)
(providing an overview of the origin and evolution of the Convention up to 2005,
as well as the role played by NGOs in the Convention).
127. See supra note 22.
128. U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, The Aarhus Convention: An
Implementation Guide, U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/72/Rev.1 (2014) at 15 [hereinafter
Aarhus Implementation Guide] (introducing the purpose and reasons behind the
Convention).
129. Id. at 75.
130. Id. at 119.
131. Id. at 187.
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To review contracting parties' compliance with the Aarhus
Convention provisions, it is possible to establish "optional
arrangements of a non-confrontational, non-judicial and consultative
nature" under article 15.132 Following this obligation, the Parties have
elected a Compliance Committee, which members of the public can
also trigger. 33
For the purpose of the article's analysis, it is worth focusing on
article 9 of the Aarhus Convention, which requires Parties to put in
place adequate (administrative or judicial) review procedures to
safeguard the rights provided in the other pillars of the Aarhus
Convention. 134
According to the complaint filed in 2008 before the Compliance
Committee by Client Heart, a British NGO, the EU violated article 9
"by applying the 'individual concern' standing criterion for private
individuals and NGOs that challenge decisions of EU institutions."'
' 35
In a report issued in 2011, the Committee considered that the
conditions under article 230 of TEC, as interpreted by the ECJ, were
too restrictive for natural and legal persons to challenge an act before
the ECJ. Moreover, according to the Committee's opinion, the
preliminary ruling procedure neither met the requirements of access
to justice under article 9 nor compensated for the strict conditions
imposed by the EU Courts. 36
132. Aarhus Convention, supra note 126, art. 15, (requiring that these
arrangements allow for appropriate public involvement and may include the option
of considering communications from members of the public on matters related to
this Convention).
133. See Aarhus Implementation Guide, supra note 128, at 224 (listing four
ways that reviews by the Compliance Committee can be triggered: (i) a Party can
make a submission about compliance by another Party; (ii) a Party may make a
submission concerning its own compliance; (iii) the secretariat may make a referral
to the Committee; (iv) members of the public may make communications
concerning a Party's compliance with the Convention).
134. Aarhus Convention, supra note 126, art. 2(2)(d), 9(3) (stating that each
Party should ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if any, set forth in its
national law, members of the public have access to administrative or judicial
procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public
authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the
environment).
135. U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Report of the Compliance Committee,
Findings and Recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/32
(Part I) concerning compliance by the European Union, Apr. 14, 2011 2.
136. Id. 76-88 (examining the case law of the EU Courts on access to
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More in detail, the report adopted by the Compliance Committee
referred to the conditions that private parties had to fulfill to have
access to justice according to article 230 of TEC, as interpreted by
the ECJ. The Committee first focused on the ECJ case law on the
requirements of direct and individual concern, finding that "no
member of the public is ever able to challenge a decision or a
regulation before the ECJ' 137 and thus concluding that the ECJ
interpretation was too strict to meet the criteria of the Aarhus
Convention. Then, the Committee verified whether the strict
interpretation could have been "compensated for by the possibility of
requesting national courts to ask for preliminary rulings by the
ECJ."'138 It concluded that the latter "cannot be a basis for generally
denying members of the public access to the EU Courts to challenge
decisions, acts and omissions by EU institutions and bodies."'' 39 On
the basis of these arguments, the Committee stated that he EU fails
to comply with article 9 because it neither ensures access to justice
nor an alternative adequate and effective remedy. 140
However, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the later
change in the admissibility conditions to bring an action for
annulment before the ECJ convinced the Committee not to adopt a
non-compliance decision. Nevertheless, the Committee specified in
the report that "if the jurisprudence of the EU Courts... were to
continue, . . . the Party concerned would fail to comply with article 9,
paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Aarhus Convention."1 41 For this reason
and to ensure compliance with the Aarhus Convention, the
Committee suggested the ECJ to interpret the admissibility
conditions of the action for annulment differently. 1
42
justice).
137. Id. 1 86 (explaining that because "individual concern" requires a
completely individual factual situation, it can never apply to environmental and
health issues).
138. Id.181.
139. Id. 1 90 (continuing to find that the preliminary review system does not
amount to an appellate system).
140. Id. 11 87, 92 (providing that "unless fully compensated for by adequate
administrative review procedures, the Party concerned would also fail to comply
with article 9, paragraph 4").
141. Id. 94 (allowing for possible exception in the case of full compensation
by adequate administrative review procedures).
142. See id. 97 (recommending a "new direction" for these admissibility
conditions).
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After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the question arises
whether article 263, para 4 of TFEU complies with the Aarhus
Convention requirements and, if not, what are the consequences.
A broad interpretation of "implementing measure," as it appears in
the European courts judgments considered above, confirm the doubts
raised by the Compliance Committee. In fact, if a EU regulatory act
intervenes in the scope of the Aarhus Convention, an interested
person would not be allowed to directly challenge such act before the
EU Courts: he or she would be obliged to challenge a national
implementing act before a domestic court and ask for a preliminary
ruling. However, according to the Compliance Committee's opinion,
the preliminary ruling is an insufficient remedy.143 Therefore, it
appears that only a narrow interpretation of the term of
"implementing measure" could ensure compliance with the Aarhus
Convention.
If this is true, this raises the question of whether treaty provisions
require the ECJ to interpret primary law as permitting the EU to
respect its international obligations. According to article 216,
paragraph 2 of TFEU, "[a]greements concluded by the [EU] are
binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member
States."144 This provision appears to require the ECJ to adopt an
interpretation of EU law, including primary law as provided in article
263 of TFEU, that permits the EU to fulfill its international
obligations. 145
143. See id. 90 (noting that "with respect o decisions, acts and omissions of
EU institutions and bodies, the system of preliminary ruling neither in itself meets
the requirements of access to justice").
144. TFEU, supra note 15, art. 216(2).
145. See Antonino Ali, Some Reflections on the Principle of Consistent
Interpretation Through the Case Law of the European Court of Justice, in
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TULLIO TREVES 881, 892 (2013) ("resorting to an
interpretation which is consistent with international law would be an opportunistic
choice aimed at avoiding the deterioration of a non-compliance scenario with the
Aarhus Convention"). In some cases, the ECJ has effectively recognized the
possibility to interpret EU primary law in the light of International Agreements.
See Case C-43/75, Defrenne, t56/58 (E.C.R. Apr. 8, 1976) available at
http://curia.europa.eu (interpreting the treaty in the light of the ILO Convention).
However, in general terms, according to the consolidated case law of the ECJ,
while there is no doubt that EU secondary legislation should be interpreted as long
as possible in the light of international agreements binding the EU, primary law is
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The General Court examined the issue in the Inuit case, rejecting
the applicants' argument that the Aarhus Convention obligation
requires a more generous interpretation of article 263, paragraph 4 of
TFEU. The General Court justified its decision by stating that
international conventions cannot depart from the TFEU, which has
established a complete system of legal remedies capable of ensuring
judicial review of the legality of acts of the Institutions and has
entrusted such review to the EU Courts. 1
46
The General Court's position is unsatisfactory. It assumes that
article 263, paragraph 4 has only one possible interpretation, the
narrow one, and that this interpretation cannot be challenged in the
light of international agreements to which the EU is a party since
such agreements are in a lower position with respect to EU primary
law. In our view, the question is different. Given that the treaty
provision has different possible interpretations, the General Court
should select the broadest one to avoid differences with the
international obligations under the Aarhus Convention. Therefore,
the issue remains open.
It is true, though, that the marginal role assumed by international
treaties to which the EU is a contracting party in the review of
legality of EU law has been recently confirmed with specific regard
to the Aarhus Convention. Overturning the General Court's ruling,'47
for a number of reasons that cannot be explained in detail in this
article, the ECJ has affirmed that the Aarhus Convention cannot even
still seen as an autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an
international agreement. Compare Case C-61/94 Commission v. Germany, 52
(E.C.R. Sept. 10, 1996) available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that primacy of
international agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of
secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is
possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements) with
Joined Cases C-402 and 415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council, 316 (E.C.R.
Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://curia.europa.eu (holding that the EC Treaty
cannot be prejudiced by an international agreement).
146. Inuit, 2011 E.C.R., 52-55 (rejecting the argument based on the
interpretation of article 263(4) of TFEU in the light of the Aarhus convention)
147. Cases T-338/08, Stichting Natuur en Milieu and PAN Europe v
Commission and T-396/09 Vereniging Milieudefensie, Stichting Stop
Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission, (E.C.R. June 14, 2012) available at
http://curia.europa.eu (holding that an EU Regulation which limits the concept of
'acts' which can be challengeable under Aarhus Convention cannot be compatible
with article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention).
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be considered a benchmark for the review of EU legislation. 148
The position taken by the ECJ is not only disappointing as to
respecting international obligations of the EU, but also difficult to
reconcile with the text of the treaties. In fact, international
agreements represent a benchmark for the review of legality of
secondary legislation. Article 216 of TFEU recognizes the binding
force of international agreements upon the Union institutions and,
according to article 3(5) of TEU, "the strict observance and the
development of international law" is firmly among the list of the
main EU objectives and values. It is evident that the interpretation
given by the ECJ, which is not willing to grant judicial review of EU
acts in the light of international obligations, is not in line with the
above-mentioned provisions. 1
49
B. THE ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND FUTURE
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The ECHR150 is an international treaty that aims to protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe. It was adopted under the
auspices of the Council of Europe in 1950 and signed by forty-seven
Member States (including all the EU Member States). The ECHR
lists the rights and freedoms that the contracting parties have to
ensure to everyone within their jurisdiction. 151 All matters concerning
the interpretation and application of the ECHR fall under the
jurisdiction of the Eur.Ct.H.R.,152 subject to the exhaustion of any
available domestic remedies.153 The Eur.Ct.H.R. judgments are
binding on the contracting parties 15 4 and the Committee of Ministers,
148. Joined Cases C-401/12P to C-403/12P Council v Vereniging
Milieudefensie; Joined Cases C-404/12P and C-405/12P Council v Stichting
Natuur en Milieu, (E.C.R. Jan. 13, 2015) available at http://curia.europa.eu
(holding that article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention cannot be relied on to assess
the legality of article 10(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006).
149. See Jeremy Wates, Secretary General of the European Environmental
Bureau, http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/news-events/news/ecj-rulings-a-setback-
for-environmental-democracy ("Today's ECJ judgments raise serious questions
about what it means for the EU to be a party to an international treaty").
150. See supra note 23.
151. Id. art. 1-18.
152. Id. 32(1).
153. Id. art. 35(1).
154. Id. art. 46(1).
[30:4
STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE
a body composed of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of all the Member
States, is responsible for supervising their execution. 155
The EU is not party to the Convention, although EU treaties
already recognize the rights guaranteed by the ECHR as general
principles of EU law. 156 Nonetheless, article 6(2) of TEU, as
amended by the Lisbon Treaty, expressly provides that the EU "shall
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect
the Union's competences as defined in the treaties."'57 After long
negotiations, the parties reached consensus on a draft agreement of
accession, but the ECJ, in its Opinion 2/13, considered that text
incompatible with the EU treaties.58 The parties should now enter
into new negotiations, although the critical remarks contained in the
ECJ Opinion and concerning the relationship between the Strasbourg
Court and the ECJ make a re-negotiation of the agreement hardly
realistic.
155. Id. art. 46(2).
156. See TEU, art. 6(3). As for the level of protection ensured by the ECJ,
article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that EU should ensure
that the rights mentioned in the Charter have at least the same level of protection
granted by the ECHR.
157. For an explanation of the accession process, see Paul Craig, EU Accession
to the ECHR: Competence, Procedure and Substance, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1114, 1117-18 (2013) (providing an overview of the accession process); Francis G.
Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Justice, in THE FUTURE OF THE
EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 291, 294 (2006)
(analyzing potential advantages and disadvantages of the accession); Tobias Lock,
EU Accession to the ECHR: Implications for Judicial Review in Strasbourg, 35
EUR. L. REV. 777, 784 (2010) (weighing the costs and benefits of having joint or
joint and several liability among the Union and the Member States).
158. For a critical analysis of the Opinion: Editorial comment, The EU's
Accession to ECHR - a "NO"from ECJ!, 52 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1-15 (2015)
(affirming that the accession of EU to the ECHR may now have turned into a
mission impossible); Benedikt Pirker and Stefan Reitemeyer, Opinion 2/13 of the
Court of Justice on Access of the EU to the ECHR- One Step Ahead and Two
Steps Back, available at http://europeanlawblog.eu (providing a concise summary
of the Court's findings, but also some early assessment and criticism of the
reactions on particular points of the Opinion). In opposing term, see Daniel
Halberstam, 'It's the Autonomy, Stupid!' A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU
Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward, 16 GERMAN L.J., 105, 105-146
(2015) (providing a comprehensive legal analysis and constitutional reconstruction
of the Opinion's many objections to show why the Court's concerns are mostly
warranted).
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In any case, if the EU accedes to the ECHR, the former will be
held directly liable for breaches of ECHR. In the light of the above,
doubts arise as to whether the system of remedies established by the
treaties is compatible with the right of access to the courts as
guaranteed and protected by article 6 of ECHR. 159
According to article 6 of ECHR, everyone has the right to access
to national courts1 60 to "challenge an act interfering with his
rights."161 However, as explained by the Strasbourg Court, such right
may be subject to limitations that (1) do not impair the very essence
of the right and (2) pursue a legitimate aim in a proportionate
manner. 162
The Eur.Ct.H.R. considers that the first condition is not met if one
is obliged to breach the law in order to have access to a Court163 or
when it is required to fulfil conditions that are not under his or her
control. 164 As explained above,165 the new wording of article 263 of
TFEU, as interpreted by the ECJ, limits the right to access to the
159. See Hildur Briem, The Preliminary Ruling Procedure as Part of a
'Complete System of Remedies ': Does the Obligation Seek a Preliminary Ruling
Ensure Effective Judicial Protection of Individuals? 1 (Spring 2005) (unpublished
Masters thesis, University of Lund) (affirming that the indirect access of
individuals to justice by means of the preliminary ruling procedure does not
comply with articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR).
160. Golderv. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 21,
1975) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
57496 (stressing that article 6 para. 1 secures to everyone the right to have any
claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal).
161. Cordova v. Italy, App. No. 40877/98, 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 30, 2003)
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-60913
(declaring that a right to ask a preliminary question is not a sufficient way to
provide for this right).
162. Petko Petkov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 2834/06, 27 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 19,
2013) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
116594 (explaining that these limitations are allowed because "the right of access
by its very nature calls for egulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of
appreciation in this regard").
163. Posti and Rahko v Finland, App. No. 27824/95, 64 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept.
24, 2002) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-
60644 (holding that no one can be required to breach the law so as to be able to
have a "civil right" determined in accordance with article 6 § 1).
164. Melis v Greece, App. No. 30604/07, 28 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 22, 2010)
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100054
(holding that requiring individuals to fulfil conditions that are not under their
control constitutes a breach of article 6 ECHR).
165. See supra Section IV.
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European courts in such a way that the very essence of the right
appears to be impaired. In particular, the ECJ's approach, which
considers preliminary ruling procedure and direct challenge as
comparable mechanisms of judicial protection, could be problematic.
In fact, as explained above, the preliminary ruling is an incidental
procedure "de juge 6 juge"'166 and not a judicial remedy for private
applicants.
Concerning the second condition, the Eur.Ct.H.R. considers a
system of limited access to justice as legitimate, if the aim is to
ensure that the courts are not overburdened with excessive and
manifestly ill-founded applications.67 Therefore, in principle, the
strict interpretation given by the ECJ on article 263(4) of TFEU
could be justified on this ground. However, the test first requires
proof that a different solution would bring about an unbearable
"charge de travail" on the shoulders of the European courts; second,
that no other "less restrictive means"168 may suffice to achieve the
above objective. In both cases, we believe that it would be a very
hard task.
Therefore, it could be reasonably argued that the interpretation of
article 263(4) of TFEU provided by the ECJ would be different from
the obligations that the EU will contract when it finalizes its
accession to the ECHR. However, given that re-negotiating the
accession agreement seems difficult at this stage, the article analyses
whether the Eur.Ct.H.R. could exercise its power of control over the
EU before the formal accession.
166. Sejdovic v Italy App. No. 56581/00, 45 (Eur. Ct. H.R. March 1, 2006)
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-72629
(pointing out that when it comes to judging on the exhaustion of domestic
remedies, the procedures that are not accessible to parties do not have to be
considered as remedies to be exhausted).
167. Stanev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36760/06, 242 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 17, 2012)
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108690
(holding that Member States can limit access to the courts with the sole aim of
ensuring that the courts are not overburdened with excessive and manifestly ill-
founded applications).
168. Id. (suggesting instead to limit the frequency with which applications may
be made, or a system for prior examination of admissibility on the basis of the
file).
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1. The Possible Way Out: Setting Aside Bosphorus Doctrine?
According to some scholars,169 the Eur.Ct.H.R. already enjoys
jurisdiction over EU respect of fundamental rights as enshrined in the
ECHR.
In fact, while Eur.Ct.H.R. does not hold jurisdiction to "directly"
examine EU acts,170 it could be competent, at least in abstracto, to
exercise an "indirect" control over measures adopted by EU Member
States that implement EU acts. In fact, EU Member States, which are
also ECHR Members, are in principle responsible for actions and
omissions of their bodies under their domestic law or under their
international legal obligations.'7' Therefore, they could be held
responsible for breaching fundamental rights guaranteed by the
ECHR when giving execution to EU primary' or secondary law. 73
Until now, however, this has never happened. The Strasbourg
Court has considered that the EU, to which Member States
transferred part of their powers, was able to ensure a level of
protection equivalent to that provided by the ECHR, as to both
substantive guarantees offered and mechanisms controlling the
observance of Convention obligations ("Bosphorus doctrine").
174
169. See Waelbroeck & Bombois, supra, note 31, at 25-37.
170. Connolly v. 15 EU Member States, App. No. 73274/0 1, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec.
9, 2008) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
90864 (holding that EU is not party to the Convention and thus it cannot be held
responsible for any violation of the latter).
171. Bosphorus v. Irlande, App. 45036/98, 153 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 30, 2005)
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-69564
(holding that a contracting party is responsible under article 1 of the Convention
for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in
question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with
international legal obligations). See also ECHR, supra note 23, art. 1 (stating that
the high contracting parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention)
172. Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. 24833/94, 44 26-35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb.
18, 1999) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-
58910 (holding UK responsibility when giving execution to EU primary law).
173. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece App. 30696/09, 335 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan.
21, 2011) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
103050 (holding Belgium responsibility when giving execution to EU secondary
law).
174. Bosphorus v. Irlande, App. 45036/98, 155, 165 (holding that the
protection of fundamental rights by Community law can be considered to be
"equivalent" to that of the Convention system).
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Therefore, both state actions taken in compliance with EU rules175
and the guarantees ensured in the procedures before the ECJ 76 are
presumed to be compatible with ECHR.
Applying the Bosphorus doctrine, the Eur.Ct.H.R. has recently
considered that the EU is capable of ensuring the right of individuals
to have access to the Court. In particular, the Strasburg Court having
recognized that "individual access to the [ECJ] is far more limited
than the access private individuals have to the Court under article 34
of the Convention" and concluded that "the supervisory mechanism
provided for in [EU] law affords protection comparable to that
provided by the Convention." 177
Although the ruling recognizes that the judicial protection offered
by the EU can be equivalent to that granted under the ECHR in
applying the Bosphorus doctrine, such conclusion is not definitive. In
fact, the presumption of equivalence between the EU and ECHR is
not absolute, but it can be rebutted if the protection of ECHR rights
in a specific situation has been "manifestly deficient."'
178
In that case, the Eur.Ct.H.R. would be called to examine the
compatibility of EU provisions with the ECHR before a formal
accession by judging the breaches of the Convention caused by
Member States when giving execution to EU Law.171 In particular,
175. Id. 155 (holding that a state action taken in compliance with EU legal
obligations is justified as long as the relevant organization is considered to protect
fundamental rights in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that
for which the Convention provides protection).
176. Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij
U.A. v. The Netherlands, App. 13645/05, B.3 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 20, 2009),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-91278
(holding that procedures before the ECJ offered guarantees which ensured
equivalent protection of the applicant).
177. Michaud v. France App. 12323/11, 111 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 6, 2012),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115377
(holding that the EU affords protection comparable to that provided by the
Convention because (i) private individuals are protected under Community law by
the actions brought before the ECJ by the Member States and the institutions of
the EU and (ii) individuals may possibl ' apply to the domestic courts to determine
whether a Member State has breached Community law, in which case the control
exercised by the ECJ takes the form of the preliminary referral procedure open to
the domestic courts).
178. Bosphorus v. Irlande, App. 45036/98, 155.
179. See Waelbroeck & Bombois, supra note 31, at 27 (considering the ECHR
applicable ratione personae and ratione materiae to Member States when
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the Eur.Ct.H.R. would hold jurisdiction to ascertain whether EU acts
(rectius EU measures implemented by the State) are capable to affect
the right of individuals to have access to the Court, as set out in
article 6(1). 180
These brief considerations have shown that, in abstracto, after the
negative opinion of the ECJ on the accession of the EU to the ECHR,
the Strasbourg Court is already competent to examine the
compatibility of EU legislation with the ECHR and to ascertain
whether EU acts impair the right to access to the Court.
The Eur.Ct.H.R. President, D. Spielmann set the first signal in this
direction when he affirmed that the Opinion 2/13 "deprives [citizens]
of the right to have acts of the European Union subjected to the...
external scrutiny as regards to respect for human rights" and
therefore it will be for the "Strasbourg Court o do what it can in
cases before it to protect citizens from the negative effects of this
situation".18' We will see in the next months if the President's
position will be reflected in Eur.Ct.H.R. future judgments.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article aimed to underline the limits of the new wording of
article 263(4), as interpreted by the ECJ, in terms of ensuring private
applicants' access to justice before the EU Courts. If the
interpretation of the term "regulatory act," limited only to the non-
legislative acts of general application, is supported by valid
arguments,182 problems arise with the interpretation of the term
"implementing measure." The solution recently adopted by the ECJ
implementing EU law).
180. Boulois v. Luxembourg, App. 37575/04, 90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 3, 2012)
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110164
(holding that for article 6 § I in its "civil" limb to be applicable, three cumulative
conditions should be fulfilled: (i) there should be a dispute over a "right"
recognized under domestic law, even if it is not protected by the ECHR; (ii) the
dispute should be "genuine and serious", and (iii) the result of the proceedings
should be "directly decisive for the right in question". See also Waelbroeck &
Bombois, supra note 31, at 28 (affirming that Article 6 ECHR could also be
applicable to the rules governing the action for annulment, if the latter is directly
decisive for the outcome of the judgement on the contested right).
181. Eur Ct.H.R., Annual Report (2014), at 6, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual-Report_2014_ENG.pdf.
182. See Section II A
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appears quite unsatisfactory. In fact, including in the scope of this
notion any measure, adopted at the national or European level, that
puts the original act into operation, makes it practically impossible
for private applicants, in a very high percentage of cases, to bring an
action before the EU Courts.
Despite the Bluefin tuna saga's "happy ending," which is limited
to a very specific situation, the new wording of article 263(4) of
TFEU does not seem to have effectively enhanced private
individuals' access to justice before the European courts. 18 3 While
the Lisbon Treaty revisions have partly relaxed the conditions for
individuals to bring an action for annulment, the strict interpretation
of "implementing measures" has de facto confirmed largely the
traditional limited access to justice for individuals.
According to the ECJ, the declaration of inadmissibility of
applications made by individuals would not leave them deprived of
judicial protection because they could always argue the invalidity of
the contested act before the ECJ via the preliminary ruling
procedure.184 However, the two remedies are by no means
equivalent; as repeatedly held by the same Court, the preliminary
ruling is in principle a means of cooperation between courts and is
not mainly intended to ensure judicial protection to individuals.
The question is now settled by the Grand Chamber and therefore it
is difficult to expect a change in the Court's position. In any event,
for a more convincing interpretation of article 263, para 4 of TFUE, a
simple and linear legal reasoning could be followed. First, the Court
should interpret the contested regulatory act to establish whether it
produces immediate legal effects, thus being immediately
challengeable before the ECJ, or rather requires "implementing
measures" to be contested before the national or European courts
(the "objective" element). Only in the first case, the Court should
also establish whether the same act directly affects the applicant in
its legal position by imposing an obligation or denying a right (the
"subjective" element of "direct concern"). This implies that in a
situation where (as in the T&L Sugars case) a regulatory act is
complete in its legal elements, there is no need to require an
183. See Section IV.
184. Id.
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additional "act of application" before a national or European
authority to give access to immediate judicial protection.
Such a different interpretation appears more in line with the
general principle of effective judicial protection as a fundamental
principle of European law, referred to in article 47 of the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights. According to this principle, "everyone whose
rights and freedoms guaranteed by [EU law] are violated has the
right to an effective remedy before a tribunal." '185 As the Charter is
fully binding upon the Institutions, 186 an interpretation more
respectful of this principle should be preferred. If such interpretation
is accepted and consequently the conditions of article 263(4) of
TFEU are relaxed, then it would be possible to fully appreciate the
innovative strength of the Lisbon Treaty, objectively limited by the
narrow interpretation of the new text provided by the ECJ. Since the
Court followed a different path, one should not exclude another
episode of this long story before the Strasbourg Court.
Moreover, a less strict approach would also reaffirm the
preliminary ruling procedure's proper role as an instrument of
judicial cooperation that can guide national courts in applying EU
law, rather than an unsatisfactory alternative to the action for
annulment.
185. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326)
391, 453, art. 47 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights] (stating that
individuals whose guaranteed rights and freedoms are violated have the right to an
effective remedy before a court); see also T&L Sugars, 2013 E.C.R. 58-59
(holding that the new wording of article 263(4) of TFEU, which prevents situations
where a person would have to breach the law to have access to justice, allows the
right to a direct remedy guaranteed by the Charter to be implemented).
186. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 185, art. 6(1) (stating that the
rights and freedoms delineated in the Charter have the same legal effect as the
treaties).
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